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For those women whose stories remain untold.
For those women whose contributions to history are overlooked.

“I remember from my childhood the story of the Katyń crime and its silencing as a point of entry
into the suppressed Polish history when after martial law, with the samizdat flourishing, my father
gave me an offset-printed publication with hardly legible type, saying, ‘You have to read it tonight.
Tomorrow I have to pass it on.’”
-

Joanna Niżyńska
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INTRODUCTION:
THE ENDURING NATIONAL TRAUMA OF KATYŃ
The plane went down in flames on the foggy morning of April 10, 2010, carrying with it
more than ninety members of the Polish cabinet. Moments earlier, Polish President Lech
Kaczyński had insisted that the plane land at the Smolensk airport in Russia, despite the pilots’
warnings that attempting to land in this weather was dangerous.1 In that moment, Kaczyński was
focused on his mission to honor the victims of the Soviet-perpetrated Katyń massacre of 1940, and
he refused to let the Russians deter him. The Russians had held a memorial service days earlier,
inviting the Polish Prime Minister to share in their message of unity and move past the tragedy.
Kaczyński strongly opposed this theme, wanting to remind Poles of the storied history of the
massacre and Soviet coverup with a subtler tone of reconciliation.2 While there is no evidence that
Russian air traffic controllers attempted to delay Kaczyński’s visit to the Polish memorial as part
of some larger conspiracy, Kaczyński believed that the Russians were trying to prevent this
speech.3 This determination caused friction with the flight crew, who ultimately acquiesced to
Kaczyński’s demands to land. With the pilots flying at a lower altitude to avoid the fog, it only
took a few moments before the plane crashed into the forest below. For the second time in seventy
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years, an upper echelon of Polish officials unexpectedly lost their lives in the Smolensk forests,
leaving the Polish nation to mourn their deaths.
Just under twenty miles away from the burning wreckage lay the memorial that President
Kaczyński intended to visit, a reminder of another massive loss of devoted Polish patriots. Pine
and birch trees loom above the large, richly symbolic rust-colored rectangles with names of Polish
soldiers etched on them. Stone slabs in the same rust color form pathways through the complex,
leading visitors to mass grave pits and religious iconography.4 There is a quietness to this place,
an unshakeable somber atmosphere befitting the event it memorializes, the Katyń massacre. In this
forest, in the Spring of 1940, the Soviet People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD)
executed approximately five thousand Polish military officers. Buried in seven mass graves, these
soldiers remained undisturbed until a German officer discovered the pits in 1943.5 The Nazis and
Soviets provided contesting explanations for these mass graves, each nation blaming the other for
these Poles’ deaths. The politicization of these soldiers’ fate endured for decades, and it was not
until 1992 that the Soviets admitted their guilt as the perpetrators of the massacre.6 For fifty years,
the Poles lived without conclusive knowledge of what truly happened to their compatriots. The
Soviet regime prohibited mention of the massacre in any location, private or public. Even more
shocking to the Poles was the revelation that one of the victims was a female military officer:
Second Lieutenant in the Polish Air Force, Janina Lewandowska. Indeed, the presence of her body
was at the center of a fifty-year cover up.
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For modern Poles, Katyń is more than another historical event studied in textbooks, it is a
constant reminder of years of suppression at the hands of the Soviet Union. The Katyń massacre
represents a denial of their history, not by their own government, but by a foreign power. Joanna
Niżyńska, Professor of Polish studies at Harvard University, articulated the lasting echoes of this
tragedy as “a symbolic national trauma, a center of gravity in the Polish sense of historical injustice
that absorbed and conflated other traumas involving Russia and the sanitization of history.”7 This
massacre cannot be commemorated with a simple wreath or speech, as befits many memorial
ceremonies. As a national trauma, there is a cross-generational awareness of the enduring weight
associated with the honoring of the victims. President Kaczyński undertook his trip to Katyń with
this burden in mind. Yet instead of assisting with the gradual assuaging of the Polish spirit, this
plane crash renewed the pain of Poles in Smolensk. The tragedy of Katyń seemed to follow the
Poles into yet another century.
For the Polish people, the story of Katyń is emblematic of their long history of national
displacement. The Poland of the twentieth century is a rather new geographic creation, its
boundaries first recognized in a formal capacity in the 1919 Versailles Treaty. Prior to the
establishment of these boundaries, the Commonwealth of Poland, established in 1569, included
territory in modern-day Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania. The neighboring countries of Germany,
Austria, and Russia led three partitions of the Commonwealth’s territory between 1772 and 1795.8
These powers utilized military force as well as diplomacy to justify and take control of their newly
acquired land. The dwindling Polish state maintained its government structure, but its weakened
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position prompted them to make political connections with Russia for assistance. European nations
mainly ignored this land grab when it occurred, their inaction becoming a trend that continued into
the Second World War.
To mitigate this sense of displacement, the Polish identity developed around a strong
allegiance to the family, the nation, and the Catholic faith. At the center of these identities was the
unique role of women in Polish life. Analysis of Janina Lewandowska’s presence in the mass
graves of Katyń provides an opportunity to examine the importance of a Polish feminine identity,
particularly during the interwar period (1918-1939). Lewandowska’s actions and legacy serve as
a case study of the specifically Polish model of femininity and motherhood: the Matka Polka.
Doing so places Lewandowska in the larger historical narrative, allowing one to see how exactly
she had the opportunity to serve in the military, eventually finding her way to Katyń.
Among the most influential societal forces in Poland is the Catholic Church, contributing
to both formal legislation and unwritten social codes. This association dates back to 1573, when
Polish kings had to be Catholic to ascend the throne.9 Though the Church and the royal hierarchy
did not always agree, their Catholic affiliation gave them additional legitimacy as shapers of
domestic policy. The eventual disappearance of the Polish state in the early 1800s also meant the
Catholic Church lost its role in a governing body of the Poles. However, after over two hundred
years, 43% of Poles identified as Christian or Catholic in 1772.10 Bolstering the Church’s influence
in Poland was the sense of connection that citizens felt existed between Christ Jesus and their
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nation. Poles related to Christ’s suffering at the hands of the Romans, facing a similar experience
as foreign powers divided up their commonwealth.
The Catholic church exerted a significant influence on women’s social positions in Poland,
as it wielded the most potent symbol of feminine strength in Poland: the Virgin Mary. Heralded as
a model for women to follow, her influence on the development of a Catholic feminine identity
provides insight into Lewandowska’s self-awareness. In 1656, the King of Poland, Jan Kazimierz,
named the Virgin Mary as the Queen of Poland, solidifying her importance and association with
the Polish state.11 Mary became a symbol of Poland through both the strong religious presence in
Poland and political declaration by Jan Kazimierz. This linkage of the Polish state directly to Mary
increased women’s responsibilities to their country. Women needed to be good mothers, but also
demonstrate a strong sense of patriotism to their children and fellow Poles.12 As the Queen of
Poland, Mary was its protector, and the women of Poland shouldered this duty as a way of honoring
this holy woman as well as serving their country. Modeling the values of Mary was a common part
of Polish femininity, with the emergence of Marian worship solidifying the strength of the
connection.
The conservative influence of the Church on Eastern European gender expectations reveals
itself in women’s involvement in Polish culture throughout its history. The domestic sphere was
the woman’s domain, raising the children a central part of her contributions to society.13 The
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political world was traditionally out of reach for women, though there were notable exceptions,
such as the Polish Queen Hedwige. This conservative legacy persists through the twenty-first
century, with conversations about a woman’s access to abortion and contraceptives remaining
particularly contentious.14 Despite increased participation in political processes and governmental
affairs, societal judgements remain when women stray from traditionally prescribed roles.
Historical examinations of women’s positions in Polish society overwhelmingly focus on the
expansion and contraction of rights since the beginning of Communist influence on the Polish state
after World War II. However, this thesis focuses on the transformative environment of the interwar
period as it pertains to women in Polish society.
Polish women’s freedom and involvement in political scenes were markedly different from
the beginning of the century to the years just before the Second World War. Women’s literacy in
Russian-partitioned Poland around the year 1900 developed mainly through education at home,
though some girls attended government-established schools.15 This education was not available to
all, and there was a disparity in female literacy rates. Limited socialization outside of the home led
women to Catholic-sponsored activities, such as rosary groups, to enjoy some level of free
conversation with peers.16 These freedoms, albeit limited, expanded over the next thirty to forty
years, and by the start of the Second World War in 1939, women could participate in both
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professional organizations (such as landowners’ associations) and political groups (such as the
Polish Socialist party).17
Existing studies of the Polish women’s liberation movement beginning in 1864 tend to
center on the divisiveness of its leadership and audience. Those individuals privileged enough to
lead this charge “attempted to reach the lower social strata, [but] in Poland, the main players were
elite educated women.”18 Historians incorporate class into their analyses of the predominant
schools of thought, conservativism and positivism. Where conservative thought aligned with
women remaining in the private space of the home, positivists, “saw themselves as members of an
oppressed national community.”19 The end goal for both conservatives and positivists was the
elevation of their gender, but in decidedly divergent ways. Their writings extolled different actions,
as conservatives recommended volunteer work in the fields of education and charity, while
positivists encouraged a sense of individual development through educational pursuits.20
Conservatives combined excellence at domestic roles and volunteer service to inspire meaningful
changes within society. In turn, these efforts reinforced women’s capacity to impact change,
garnering additional respect and elevating their gender. The positivists turned inwards for a sense
of liberation, while the conservatives expressed their femininity by showing their important
contributions to society to garner additional respect.
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Tracing the Catholic discourse on the Virgin Mary in Poland allows for a close examination
into the core principles that contribute to the Polish model of femininity, the Matka Polka. Mary’s
appearance in Polish anthems, artwork, and legendary military accomplishments further links the
Polish nation to Catholicism and the latter’s influence on the defined role women play in Polish
society. This thesis explores each attribute of this ideal, incorporating survey results of Polish
female citizens to determine the enduring legacy of this prescribed identity. Contrasting the model
of femininity with developments in women’s political rights allows for analysis of female citizens’
increased involvement in the public sphere. Women’s participation in the First World War clarifies
the precedents and societal attitudes which lasted into the interwar period. These developments
contextualize the social conditions that permitted Janina Lewandowska’s enlistment in the Polish
Air Force.
After exploring the prevalent influences on Lewandowska’s formative years, this thesis
turns to the three Soviet Prisoner of War (POW) camps that housed the future victims of Katyń.
The Kozielsk camp, which held Janina Lewandowska for the majority of her imprisonment,
receives specific attention. Building upon memoirs of those fortunate enough to escape the tragic
fate of other prisoners, this thesis explores the underground faith life in the POW camp and
Lewandowska’s involvement in it. Her production of wafers for the Catholic Eucharist provides
an opportunity to analyze her adaptations and divergence from the established model of femininity.
Although many elements of her day-to-day experience are lost, a cautious examination of rumors
and whispers of her actions reveals her central role at the camp.
The discovery of Lewandowska’s body provides insight into the geopolitical struggle
exacerbated by the Katyń massacre. Analysis of both German and Soviet explanations of the
massacre, and the threat her presence posed, emphasizes the delicate nature of World War II

9
alliances and international ranking of pressing matters. Polish response to the Allies’ complacency
toward the Soviet-perpetrated massacre demonstrates the origins of the Katyń massacre’s impact
on the Polish mentality. The conscious effort to hide Lewandowska’s presence from the world by
Nazi forces leads into analysis as to foreign expectations of Polish women’s involvement in the
military at the beginning of the war. The Soviets’ conscious employment of suspect testimony
produced by Soviet women further indicates assumptions as to innate qualities of women by
predominant powers during the Second World War.
Exploring the life of Janina Lewandowska offers more than an expanded biography for a
Polish woman, it allows for an in-depth examination of these components in Polish society during
the interwar period. Although history remembers the contributions of the Emilia Plater Polish
Independent Women’s Battalion and the Polish Auxiliary Air Force (PLSK), the creation of these
groups occurred midway through the Second World War. Studies of women’s involvement in the
early stages of the war, specifically their contributions to the September 1939 Polish defense, is
virtually nonexistent. An examination of Janina Lewandowska’s life contributes to filling this gap,
revealing some boundaries women faced entering the military service before respected Polish
generals, such as Wladyslaw Anders, sanctioned it. In risking her life and social standing,
Lewandowska reinterpreted the traditional ideal of the Matka Polka, choosing to serve her country
militarily. Though she adopted some of these maternal approaches when nurturing Polish
patriotism while in the Kozielsk camp, she preempted this aspect of her identity with the decision
to pursue military service before motherhood. She may not be representative of all women who
made similar decisions, but her life makes a unique contribution to understanding social
expectations of women as one of the first Polish women to involve herself in active service during
World War II.

10
Internalization of traditional feminine responsibilities and a strong sense of national pride
led Janina Lewandowska to serve her country as a member of the Polish Air Force at the outbreak
of the Second World War. Although her capture by Soviet forces in late September of 1939 put an
end to active military service, it did not stop the young officer from serving her country through
other means. In the graves at Katyń, one finds the body of a female fighter pilot, as well as the
story of a growing nation seeking to define itself, one woman’s devotion to both her faith and
fellow soldiers, and the supersession of country over the self.

CHAPTER ONE: “GAZING UPON THE SWORD”:
THE MATKA POLKA AND FEMININITY IN INTERWAR POLAND
Staring at the Soviet soldiers and military hardware confronting her, one can only imagine
what Second Lieutenant Janina Lewandowska must have thought. Three hundred miles from her
home, her air base, and the city where she grew up, she faced an uncertain future. Her unit’s attempt
to evacuate East to safety was unsuccessful after the Soviet forces stopped their train.21 Although
she knew capture by the enemy was a possibility when she enlisted, her love of flying relegated
this thought to the back of her mind. The Air Force allowed her to touch the skies while defending
her country; and if capture was the cost, she would accept it. Her thoughts likely drifted to her
husband, then snapped back when the Soviet officer waved her and Captain Jozef Sidor towards a
commandeered ambulance. She would not continue with the rest of the 3rd Military Aviation
Regiment.22 Although miles away from home, Second Lieutenant Lewandowska carried with her
the lessons of femininity absorbed from hours spent praying to the Virgin Mary and helping out at
home. Whatever came next, she promised herself, she would face it with the strength and grace
expected of Polish women.23
21
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22
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Born in 1908, Janina Lewandowska’s father was Polish General Dowbor Muśnicki. She
grew up in a Poland in conflict, both externally and internally.24 Her father left when she was eight
to command military units during the First World War, while she remained at home, immersed in
the patriotic Matka Polka model. She likely heard about the young women in the Voluntary Legion
of Women (OLK) not much older than herself, leaving to do their part to protect Polish lands.
Coming of age in the largely Catholic province of Poznań, faith and Marian values were
inescapable, further shaping her view of her particular role in Poland.25 Lewandowska matured in
a culture where women gained political rights, yet still fulfilled maternal responsibilities to the
State and mirrored the stoicism of the Virgin Mary.
Although modern-day Poland is predominantly Catholic—in 2006, 95.1% of Poles selfcategorized as Roman Catholic—this was not always the case.26 As Poland’s physical boundaries
shifted, the religious demographic of its people changed as well. In 1772, Roman Catholicism
accounted for 43% of the populace’s religious affiliations, the largest bloc of practicing faithful.
The remaining 57% included Uniates (33%), Russian Orthodox members (10%), Jews (9%),
Protestants (4%) Muslims, Armenians, Frankists, and Old Believers (1%).27 After the frequent
partitions of Poland, it was difficult for any one government to establish itself and earn the loyalty
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of all its citizens. The consistency of the Catholic Church’s organization, however, provided a
steady voice of leadership that gained popularity amongst citizens. The structured organization of
the Church provided stability, along with an identity that was not dependent on one’s physical
location.28 With the establishment of the Polish state’s borders at the conclusion of the First World
War, the statistics shifted once again. The makeup of interwar Poland contained a little over three
million Jews (about 10% of the population), while two-thirds of its citizens identified as Roman
Catholic.29 These new percentages reflected the beginnings of a Catholic-Polish narrative.
Theologian Professor Ronald Modras notes that individuals referred to this recreated Poland as
“zmartwychwstana,” or “resurrected.”30 After surviving multiple partitions and numerous
conflicts, this ‘new’ Poland was the survivor, emerging against all odds. This narrative points to a
Polish trend of comparing the collective suffering of its citizens to the suffering of Christ Jesus.
Out of this comparison came an increased dedication and faith to Him and the Church among
Polish Catholic citizens.
As a nation with a large practicing Catholic population, one of the role models for citizens
was the ‘holy family,’ composed of Jesus, Mary, and Joseph. Catholic veneration of the Virgin
Mary incorporates rosary prayers and feast days as a part of this devotion. The Polish celebration
of Mary also dedicates two extra feast days to her.31 Mary’s affiliation with the Polish state was
not only built upon belief of her saintliness but also her identity as Christ Jesus’ mother. Her

28
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identity is twofold, comprised of a faithful guardian of Poland as well as a domestic archetype.
Historian Brian Porter summarizes the dual function of Mary’s linkage to Poland, stating “Mary
is a powerful, sometimes militant protector of Poland; on the other hand, she is an exemplar of
feminine domesticity. She guides the nation to victory even as she demonstrates how to sustain the
national hearth and home.”32 Mary assists both the men and women of Poland in completing their
civic duties, both in defending the nation and raising its future defenders.
The direction of prayers to Mary, as opposed to Christ Jesus or other saintly figures, comes
out of a distinct Polish narrative. In this portrayal of Poland, a crucified Jesus represents the Polish
state’s continued struggles for recognition and unity, and Mary’s presence at the foot of the cross
is a comforting Divine assistance.33 With this image strongly placed in Polish cultural thought,
Mary became the intercessor for the Polish peoples throughout their history. Her perceived role in
battlefield victories solidified her position within the Polish state as its Queen. Mary’s invocation
by Polish soldiers is well-documented, illustrated by her saving presence in both the Bogurodzica
(one of the oldest Polish anthems from the 1400s) and the story of the Battle of Jasna Góra in
1655.34 Sung at the Battle of Grunwald in 1410, the Bogurodzica calls upon Mary for assistance
on the battlefield. In chorus, the Polish soldiers prayed that “Virgin, Mother of God,/Maria,
honoured by God,/Your son’s patroness,/Maria, chosen Mother!/Assist us.”35 The praises to Mary
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are accompanied by a request that she assist with the defense of the Polish homeland against
Teutonic Knights. Two hundred years later, Swedish forces attacked the monastery of Jasna Góra
that contained a portrait of the Virgin Mary known as Our Lady of Częstochowa. The faithful
Poles defending the structure reported a vision of the Blessed Mother preventing Swedish cannons
from harming either the monastery or the Polish soldiers.36 This story further defined Mary’s role
as a protectress in the Polish imagination.
The strong connection between Mary and the Polish state continued to affect Poland’s
culture in the ensuing centuries. Józef Bilczewski, the Archbishop of Lviv during the beginning of
the twentieth century, observed that Marian “veneration has penetrated to the very foundation of
the nation, has become a constituent part of the Polish soul, has left its mark on our traditions and
customs…Our history, throughout the centuries, is virtually a history of Mary in the nation.”37 The
Poles knew they had a special relationship with Mary and recognized its duration as a point of
pride. Mary’s intercessions and consistent invocation as a model for citizens to emulate solidified
this connection.
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Figure 1. Our Lady of Częstochowa.
Paintings of the Virgin Mary took on a new meaning in Poland, reflecting more than simple
religious adoration, but also her strong connection to the political struggles of the Poles. The most
famous example of this is the painting of Our Lady of Częstochowa.38 Already an important piece
of Catholic imagery after the Battle of Jasna Góra, its continued survival, despite sustaining
damages incurred in other military conflicts, solidified it in the Polish-Marian imagination.39 In
1979, Pope John Paul II reiterated the significance that Mary has to the Polish nation. “If we want
to know how this history is reflected in the hearts of the Poles,” he stated, “We must put our ear to
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this place. We must hear the echo of the Nation’s life in the Heart of Its Mother and Queen.”40 His
reference to the famed painting of Our Lady of Częstochowa was more than an exhibit of the
painting’s significance. He spoke of a larger connection, stating that in Mary, one finds and
comprehends the Polish story.
Pope John Paul II’s characterization of this recognition indicates the importance of
understanding Mary as a formative part of Polish history. The painting represents the relationship
that the Poles have with Mary. Two saber slashes across Mary’s cheek result from physical
damage, but the Poles continue to associate the painting with Polish efforts to defend an
independent and faithful nation, despite numerous conflicts and defeats in battle. The injury to the
painting becomes a part of the narrative, giving it an added dimension to Poles. With Mary
sustaining that damage and continuing to intercede on the behalf of the faithful, she becomes all
the more powerful and deserving of the Poles’ praise and veneration.
For Polish women, Mary served as both a model for action and a confidante during
moments of sorrow and sacrifice during motherhood. As someone who lost her own son, Mary
was recognizable as someone mothers could turn to, knowing she felt the same pain.41 The hymns
and praises delivered to Mary by the Polish faithful coupled with a sense of sorority to raise Mary
into a model for women to follow. Observing the pain Mary experienced allowed these women to
see their sacrifices as mirroring hers. Mary gave her child up for God’s purposes, and for Polish
women, their children’s martyrdom had the greater Polish society in mind. If Mary faced all those
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pains and continued to trust in God, the reasoning suggests that women should do the same for
Poland, despite their losses.
Mary’s consistent presence facilitated female citizens’ adoption of certain behaviors
intended to mirror Mary’s holy demeanor. Summarizing interviews conducted in 2005 with
Northern Polish women, anthropologist Agnieszka Kościańska reiterates the present belief that,
“women should be like the Madonna: humble, quiet, family-oriented, and responsible. Being silent
and humble is a source of power for them and allows them to act beyond the private sphere, despite
the fact that they fundamentally believe that women belong to the domestic realm.”42 The use of
‘should’ indicates the strong belief that Mary serves as an ideal for women. This conviction leads
into a recitation of the specific traits, each of which convey a sense that women are not to be
actively involved in the public realm. Polish women provide a certain stability by adhering to these
maxims, supporting continued functionality within their country. Much like Mary, these women
have a protecting, comforting, and orderly presence. By practicing these behaviors, women feel
closer to Mary, their model. Nineteenth century Polish feminist Eleanora Ziemiȩcka was a strong
proponent of the power enshrined in this intimate relationship with Mary, going so far as to claim
that women would save society by following Mary’s model of femininity.43 Such a claim is
possible because out of this sense of connection, a strength emerges, as Mary is with them. In
respecting and imitating the Virgin Mary, Polish women influence change through her
intercession. They may not be the individual actors, instead using their connection to Mary to
fortify the nation in spirit.
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Much of the Virgin Mary’s identity emerges from her status as the “mother of God” in the
form of Christ Jesus. As noted, the Polish state strongly identified with Mary, so it is unsurprising
that motherhood was defined as central to Polish women’s role and duty to their country. This
status as the bearer of Polish children represents a convergence of the political and the religious in
Poland: Mary’s model as the ideal woman coupled with the necessity of raising patriotic fighters
to combat threats to the country’s survival. Both the government and Polish artists contributed to
the merging of material and patriotic functions as exemplified to create a new model of Polish
womanhood: “Matka Polka,” translated as “Polish Mother.”
This concept is more than a simple descriptor for Polish women who have children; it
ascribes a political role for motherhood in Poland.44 With constant existential threats on the minds
of Polish citizens, patriotism grew in significance. The Polish poet, Adam Mickiewicz, was one of
the first to formally align motherhood with patriotism by linking maternal duties to the raising of
future martyrs. His seminal poem from 1831, “To a Polish Mother,” informed Polish mothers of
their sons’ future fates, as “In battle—without glory—must he share/In martyrdom-with an eternal
tomb.”45 In a somber, straightforward manner, the verse informs mothers of the inevitable fate of
their children. Mickiewicz wrote this work after the failure of a Polish uprising against the Russian
government. Though his words served primarily as a reaction to events in Poland at that time, they
also solidify the connection between Mary and Polish motherhood, with his reflection that, “O
Polish mother, ill must be his part!/Before the Mother of Our Sorrows kneel/Gaze on the sword
that cleaves her living heart—/Such is the cruel blow thy breast shall feel!”46 Drawing on the
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strength of the Marian connection to the Polish state, Mickiewicz directs these mothers to their
divine Mother for support and solace. He vividly described the Virgin Mary with a sword through
her heart to illustrate how Mary connects to these mothers’ present pains of losing their sons in
combat.
A study of murals painted in a Warsaw town square by Zofia Stryjeńska in 1928 shows the
dissemination of this idea. Her depictions of women echo the sentiments of Mickiewicz, based
partly on models of the Virgin Mary and the inevitable maternal mourning.47 Stryjeńska’s Women
Carrying Water murals show women holding jugs that spill water onto the earth below her,
symbolizing a rebirth of the Polish land. This spilled water also connects to the roles of the martyrs
in Mickiewicz work. Just as the water falls and nourishes the earth, so the sacrifices of these
individuals provide for the furtherance of the nation’s existence. Stryjeńska’s women hold these
heavy containers with life-giving water on their shoulders, all while it seems to fruitlessly escape
the confines of the pottery.48 The water, like the Polish children, leaves its “home,” allowing the
earth below the woman’s feet to continue supporting life. These paintings also have golden
backgrounds, similar to religious Byzantine art pieces.49 Subdued connections to other religious
imagery further the link between Stryjeńska’s women and the Virgin Mary, model of the Matka
Polka. Despite the elapsing of time between Mickiewicz and Stryjeńska’s works, their thematic
consistency reinforces the lasting quality of this image of motherhood across generations.
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In emphasizing this responsibility of Polish mothers, Mickiewicz’s poem also focuses on
a secondary identity, wherein these women suppressed their suffering to raise children with strong
senses of patriotism.50 The inescapable martyrdom their children faced also meant that mental
anguish was an inevitable component of women’s existence. Women had to contain these
emotions, however, in order to fulfill their duty effectively. Internalizing this fear and sadness
allowed for the maximizing of patriotic education of Polish sons, untainted by any “selfish” sorrow
or attempts to prevent them from defending the country. The personal aligned with the political,
and women became reliable defenders of the Polish identity. As historian Stefania Bernini notes,
“it was Polish wives, mothers, and grandmothers who guarded the traditions, provided the social
infrastructure, comforted the activists, and told their men folk where their duty lay.”51 This
responsibility made women central figures in the furtherance of Polish society, allowing them to
instill in their children the values that all Poles needed to serve their country with pride. The work
occurred within the domain of the home, which meant that women could continue their everyday
domestic tasks without interruption. From the government’s perspective, allowing women to play
such an important role in the life of the nation was acceptable as long as they remained faithful to
their traditional responsibilities.52 There was no lessening of tasks for these women, as the house
still needed upkeep and the family still needed its meals. Mothers performed an important role, but
they remained under the purview of male oversight in both domestic and social settings.
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The added responsibilities that the Polish state both explicitly and subtly gave to women
were not without consequence. After divorcing her husband, the government confiscated Polish
intellectual Eliza Orzeszkowa’s property in 1864 as a retaliatory measure for abandoning a
pathway to motherhood through her marriage.53 Such reinforcements contributed to a constant
sense of isolation for women, as society judged their lives by their success at becoming mothers
to sons who would serve the country. This sense of loneliness manifested in multiple ways, the
first being the attainment of the “mother” title. For those unable to conceive or carry a child to
term, shame was an ever-present emotion, compounded by the elevation of motherhood as the
ideal contribution of women for their country. Unwanted pregnancies inspired additional negative
emotions, as the struggle between personal and national preference led to guilt.54 There was little
room for a woman to decide whether she wanted to be a mother. Since “having children was…the
expression of a certain attitude, the recognition of motherhood as a social role,” the absence of
children did not reflect positively on a woman’s perceived level of patriotism.55 Though the
expectation that women become mothers was not unique to Polish society, Polish women’s intense
internalization of this tenet reflected the inescapable quality of this expectation within society.
Whether in the political realm, with the linkage of motherhood to furthering patriotic ideals, or in
Catholic influences, with the devotion to the Virgin Mary, deviance from this identity attracted
negative community attention.
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Those women who attained the maternal title struggled to reach out and form a community
of support with other mothers, resulting in feelings of isolation. Although expected to flourish in
both motherhood and domestic tasks, Polish women’s success at the former was more important
to the Polish nation. Adopting the identity of “Polish motherhood” continued to appear in Polish
women’s reflections on their responsibilities. A 2002 survey reveals the lasting impact of this
model, with respondents noting that, “without my sacrifice my family would not manage,” and
that, “I bear on my shoulders so many things, that they would be enough for several other
women.”56 It is tempting to view these comments as recognition of women’s importance and their
centrality in the Polish community, but language reveals the internalized pressures of societal
expectations. ‘Sacrifice,’ for instance, carries a weight that words such as ‘work’ or ‘dedicated
efforts’ do not. There is also the association of ‘sacrifice’ with Polish motherhood, the
understanding being that one’s children may be sacrificed in combat to protect the country.
The idea that no other single woman could bear the weights that this mother shouldered
further indicates an internalized sense of competitiveness. Rather than normalizing the sharing of
tasks, the Polish state’s model of motherhood led some women to adopt a mentality where they
felt that they should handle the responsibilities of motherhood alone.57 The Catholic affiliation of
Mary’s motherhood offered no solace either, as the Virgin Mary raised Christ Jesus in her family
unit, not soliciting assistance from others. Luke’s gospel provides an exception to this, when Mary
and Joseph employ assistance from companions to find him during the time that he remained
behind in Jerusalem. Even this moment is a rare occurrence, outside of the usual realm of
motherhood and child-rearing. Reaching out to another woman, whether family or a friend, was a
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struggle, as it meant admitting difficulty with living up to the Matka Polka standard of motherhood.
For the most part, Polish mothers shouldered the responsibilities of raising patriotic children and
maintaining the house without requests for assistance.
Although the Matka Polka model maintained its strength in Poland during the interwar
period, variations on this ideal manifested themselves in Polish culture, allowing women to branch
out into more active political and military participation. Granting Polish women the right to vote
late in 1918 kept with the trend of global powers expanding their definitions of who made up the
electorate in their respective countries. Women could first vote in 1919, and 66.9% of Polish
women participated, as compared with 71.5% of men. This figure dropped only slightly nine years
later, with 65.4% of women participating in a 1928 election.58 The consistency of female voter
turnout indicates that gaining this form of involvement in shaping their country was significant,
despite the reality that many continued to adhere strictly to the Matka Polka model. Eligibility to
leave the domestic setting and actively participate in the political realm as a voter led into the 1921
expansion of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland to provide equal political rights for both
sexes under the law.
Despite gaining more political rights and representation, historian Anna Żarnowska notes
that, “This did not signify, however, a complete and consistent liquidation of legal limitations
discriminating against women, most obvious within civil law.”59 Civil law, relating to spousal
relations, prevented a full equality between male and female Polish citizens. The prevailing
structure for civil law in Poland drew from the French’s 1804 Napoleonic Code, under which,

58

Anna Żarnowska, “Women’s Political Participation in Inter-war Poland: opportunities and limitations,”
Women’s History Review 13, no. 1 (2004): 58, https://doi.org/10.1080/09612020400200382.
59

64.

Anna Żarnowska, “Women’s Political Participation in Inter-war Poland: opportunities and limitations,”

25
women’s wages, profits, and property were under the husband’s control.60 Utilizing this antiquated
doctrine to govern the civil relations and divisions of duties between Polish men and women posed
a point of contention. Attempts to rework this civil law for equality proved difficult in Poland.
Women gained some control over property, but only in specific situations where a husband or
father had minimal to no involvement in the purchasing or maintenance of it. In the event that a
woman held a job, she also gained control over her earnings.61 However, with the constantly
reinforced Matka Polka identity, such occurrences were unlikely. Inclusion of those particular
women’s rights stemmed from a belief that any such gains resulted from a sustained demonstration
that women were patriotic members of society.62 Despite granting political equality, the belief that
women were inferior and had to prove their loyalty to earn rights persisted. Such an idea
contradicts the belief that the Matka Polka excels at raising patriotic children and is herself a model
patriot. Members of committees dedicated to revising the civil law held contradictory beliefs,
resulting in few actual changes to the code. Polish law slowly advanced women’s opportunities to
leave the home, but such legal concessions did not outweigh the continued active encouragement
of traditional motherhood.
As women gained new spaces for participation in the public sphere, these areas emphasized
women’s duties to their nation rather than as a space for socialization. Each of the more than eighty
women’s organizations founded throughout Poland during the interwar period had a varying focus,
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be it religious, social, or professional.63 Religious groups upheld the status quo, providing an
opportunity for women to participate in activities such as praying the rosary. This action was both
social and also a reminder of the Virgin Mary, allowing the Church to retain its influence over
women even during their breaks from the domestic side of their lives. Professional organizations,
such as the United Circle of Women Landowners (ZKZ), focused on a higher responsibility to the
state by preserving their Polish identity while also completing the work.64 Demonstrating
proficiency in professional or athletic organizations was simply another way to serve their country.
Rather than reflect upon their individual capabilities, any task or achievement these women
completed belonged to the Polish state, indicating the communal nature of work it provided its
citizens. Women’s contributions to society reflected back on the country at large, leaving them
little space for themselves.
With the expansion of individual women’s participation in politics and social
organizations, spaces traditionally reserved for men began to open, including in sports and military
service. Beginning from the practical reasoning that healthy mothers birthed healthy children who
grew into healthy Polish citizens and martyrs, the Polish government encouraged women’s
physical activity. Many of the social expectations on women emerged from the preoccupation with
tomorrow’s citizens and the future of the country, which traced back to the mothers.65 Sports
groups, such as the Warsaw Oarswoman Club (WKW), experienced an increase in membership

63
Malgorzata Fuszara, “Between Feminism and the Catholic Church: The Woman’s Movement in Poland,”
Czech Sociological Review 41, no. 6 (2005): 1063, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41132243.
64

Nameeta Mathur, “The New Sportswoman: Nationalism, Feminism and Women’s Physical Culture in
Interwar Poland,” The Polish Review 48, no. 4 (2003): 452, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25779426; Robert M.
Ponichtera, “Feminists, Nationalists, and Soldiers: Women in the Fight for Polish Independence,” The International
History Review, 19 no. 1 (1997): 18, DOI: 10.1080/07075332.1997.9640772.
65

Nameeta Mathur, “The New Sportswoman: Nationalism, Feminism and Women’s Physical Culture in
Interwar Poland,” 445.

27
during the interwar period. The WKW went from 268 members in 1928 to 692 in 1931, inspired
by the societal view that such an activity was a perfect way to demonstrate physical strength and
patriotism.66 Competitions, ranging from tennis to riflery, allowed women to socialize outside of
the home, with the added benefit of demonstrating the superior health and fitness of Polish women.
The victors of such events could not escape their domestic identities, as “Female athletes were
portrayed as good mothers and wives, and the newspapers and periodicals often showed pictures
of sportswomen with their children.”67 The press, which was an extension of State power and
reinforcer of cultural perceptions, continued to remind all that women were, first and foremost,
preservers of the future of Poland through childbirth. Gradual expansion of activities outside the
home for women to enjoy did not diminish those aspects of life which society deemed central for
women, with the reflection of the Matka Polka model in each new option.
Along with the more traditional sports activities included in the physical culture of Poland,
women could participate in events such as gliding and parachuting. Women who entered the realm
of air sports received a different level of respect, often given the title of ‘queens of the air.’ This
honor is striking as it bestows the ‘queen’ identifier, also given to Mary in her connection to the
Polish state. The power given to women that participated in these activities still connected to the
overarching model for womanhood in Poland. Recalling that the expectation of women involved
in these sports was that they still raise a family, this title indicates that these women demonstrate
a superior quality in their physicality and dedication to the state. As historian Nameeta Mathur
notes, “Women in aviation…successfully undermined traditional biological conservatism
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according to which women possessed shortcomings and defects…Polish female aviators
demonstrated abilities of rational reasoning, physical strength, and confidence.”68 Whereas success
in other sports received praise, aviation set women apart due to the complexity of the activity.
Although these female participants demonstrated a capacity for reasoning and strength, the
persistent belief in the inferiority of women prevented this development from having a larger
impact on women’s social standing. Yet the distinctions and verbal honors given to these women
were still significant, existing in the greater context of the gradual recognition that women’s
capacity for activities traditionally deemed ‘masculine’ was the same as their male counterparts.
During the First World War, women took a more active role in the military defense of the
nation, although they could not completely shake the gendered expectations of society. Women
participated in a range of sectors of military work, including espionage, firing squads, nursing, and
performing laundry and culinary tasks for soldiers.69 Certainly, their involvement as spies and
members of firing squads is surprising considering the stringent social barriers for women in
military affairs, but these roles were not quite as radical as they seemed. The reason women were
effective spies was that their male targets did not make much of female citizens, leading to lapses
in security procedures and subsequently overheard conversations by these spies.70 Use of firearms
and participation in firing squads also seems to break with traditional gender norms. However,
with the developing women’s physical culture in Poland, it was not unusual for women to possess
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skills in riflery. With these two exceptions, women’s involvement was what one might expect,
carrying out duties also done at home, such as cooking, cleaning, and caring for others.
The establishment of the Voluntary Legion of Women (OLK) as an active branch in the
Polish military provided women the opportunity to participate in more combat-related activities
during World War I. Members’ duties ranged from laundry and nursing to guard duty and active
combat.71 Membership in this service group was relatively low during the war, with approximately
350 women participating.72 Between 1919 and 1921, enrollment increased to 4000 women, likely
owing to the sustained geopolitical conflicts around the new nation.73 Approximately 39% of those
enrolled were twenty-one years old or younger.74 The age factor provides an interesting point of
analysis for motivations of enlistment. Though rationales are certainly mixed, younger women had
less experience than the older subset with social condemnations for diverging from maternal roles.
Without these additional years of exposure to these gendered expectations, younger women found
the prospect more lucrative and less costly in terms of feminine reputation. Fewer such negative
experiences coupled with a sense of optimism that a postwar Poland would be a place of liberation
and equal rights, contributing to this trend in OLK enlistment.75 Although this is not an
overwhelming statistic, the data reveals that some women did depart from the traditional roles of
nurses and cooks to assist their country in a more nontraditional manner.
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The pushback to the OLK’s creation and work came from multiple sectors of society. Some
military generals complained that women should remain in auxiliary roles instead of active combat
ones. Polish General Józef Haller cited traditional gender norms in his opposition to the OLK,
stating that “In the Polish army, as in any other army, a woman may in the future serve in auxiliary
units which are suited to women’s nature, such as nursing, secretarial work (typing) or household
duties. She must be unconditionally excluded from the regular units of the Polish army as well as
from bearing arms.”76 Few women’s associations not aligned with the liberation movement lent
support to this group, and the press was another source of criticism.77 The critical voices are a
reminder of how unusual this group was and the challenge it posed to the status quo. With women’s
professional and social organizations widely refusing to celebrate this new development, one gets
the sense of the depth to which gender norms were imbued. Even the women’s liberation
movement was not the most excited about the OLK, as evident in their reticence to endorse it.78
This distinct lack of societal praise indicates that motives for joining were predominantly patriotic
and not self-serving. A willingness to bear the constant critiques, even from groups one might
expect to issue endorsements, is telling of participants’ character. Though the nation was lukewarm
to their service, they carried on with it because service to the country came first, even before one’s
name and reputation.
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After a series of dedicated efforts in the First World War, women’s involvement in military
affairs began to wane during the interwar period. With a return to political ‘normalcy’ came an
expectation that women return to their homes. The ingrained cultural maxims that women were
mothers first before servicewomen facilitated this restoration of Polish gender norms as the need
for military forces decreased.79 Global conflicts caused temporary changes in the established
division of responsibility and involvement in political life. This phenomenon did not occur without
some pushback from women, though the result was seemingly inevitable due to the strength of
gendered cultural expectations.
Helena Ceysinger, a servicewoman in the OLK who served during World War I, attempted
to expand military training for all female Polish citizens. Linking her argument to the model of the
Matka Polka, she claimed that “it is necessary that through a woman – the educator of future
generations and the organiser of family hearth – the strength and seriousness in embracing the
demands of life is inserted into the nation.”80 If women had military training, they could better
fulfill their duties to the Polish state, acquiring a new skill set that could be utilized in times of
conflict. Their central role in furthering the health of the Polish state was a given fact, and
Ceysinger believed that such an expansion of responsibilities would only have a positive effect.
Nonetheless, women’s military service organizations gradually disappeared from the national
stage.
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When the Second World War broke out in September 1939, there were no formal female
military organizations. Prominent service groups such as the Polish Women’s Auxiliary (PSK) and
Emilia Plater Battalion came into existence two to three years later. The responsibilities of those
who served in such units once again ranged from nursing to serving as sentries.81 Women’s
participation inspired mixed responses, with some praising their patriotism and others bemoaning
the fact these women abandoned the hearth for a man’s place.82 The formation of these units
occurred while the Polish government was in exile and was likely a reflection of the Polish
government’s willingness to do whatever it could to reclaim the Polish homeland. The PSK and
Emilia Plater Battalion were not widely available for women to join at the start of the conflict, and
there are few occurrences of Polish women’s military participation during the early stages of World
War II. Those who entered the service had renowned skills demonstrated through competitions or
training courses, or through their personal connections to the military. It was easier for women to
join the military forces later in the war, simply enlisting in organizations sponsored by the
government or prominent military generals.83
The complex intertwining of traditional Matka Polka values and women’s expansions into
historically male-dominated spheres remained in Lewandowska’s mind throughout high school,
where she earned certifications and set records in both parachuting and gliding.84 Exceptional
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performance in these pastimes reflected the strength and health expected of ideal Polish mothers,
a fact that Lewandowska well knew. In addition to pursuing interests in physical activities that
tested strength, she studied radiotelegraphy in Lviv.85 These ventures demonstrate that
Lewandowska had at least a passing interest in military affairs. Women’s involvement in aviation
and riflery pastimes were not unusual, but they were not necessarily popular. Her decision to
pursue this activity indicates her self-awareness of both her physicality and intellect, two skills
that a military career could highlight.
When Lewandowska enrolled in a radiotelegraphy course in 1937, Polish relations with
Germany were civil. Early in the year, both Hermann Göring and Adolf Hitler denied territorial
ambitions along the Polish border.86 Existing tensions between the two countries over the Nazi
leadership in the Free City of Danzig appeared to be under control. Starting with the German
annexation of Austria in 1938, Polish-German relations began to deteriorate. Though the Germans
soothed tensions between Poland and Lithuania, their seizure of the Sudetenland in
Czechoslovakia caused the Poles to grow nervous for their sovereignty.87 During 1939, the Polish
government solidified its alliances with key European countries, such as France. Polish
communications in the months preceding the 1939 invasion left officials with hope that foreign
intervention would be swift to reduce the destruction to their country.88 Lewandowska’s entrance
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into radiotelegraphy and the Polish Air Force occurred in a period of national tension with
neighboring states. There was no active military conflict, but the threat of one was ever-present,
and as a high-schooler, Lewandowska was aware of these issues. Her patriotic inclinations appear
to have factored into her decision to take passions for parachuting and apply them to national
defense.
Despite seeming to push the boundaries and occupy a newly opened space for women in
Polish society, Lewandowska did not stray from cultural expectation of marriage, wedding pilot
Mieczyslaw Lewandowski early in 1939.89 Up until this point in her life, Lewandowska remained
within the gender norms accepted by society. She demonstrated exceptional physical fitness,
married at an acceptable age, and lived in a religiously faithful manner. If the Second World War
had not occurred, it is possible she would have continued to follow expectations by bearing
children and raising them to be just as patriotic as her father was. The outbreak of the war, however,
presented Lewandowska the opportunity to put her skills and connections to the test.
A member of the Polish Army reserve since 1937, Lewandowska transferred into the active
3rd Aviation Regiment at the “ground echelon of Air Force Base No. 3” in August of 1939.90 Her
ability to join these military units was a result of several factors: her father’s prominence in the
Polish military, her skills in aviation, and her knowledge of radiotelegraphy. It is difficult to state
which of the three reasons proved the most persuasive to the military forces who allowed her to
volunteer, but she was undoubtedly a qualified individual. There are no records of her attempting
to use her family name to give her an advantage, though the shadow of her father’s name possibly
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played an unintentional role. With women’s involvement limited this early in the conflict,
Lewandowska’s inclusion in military aviation was an unusual exception. In joining the air force,
Lewandowska was not wholly a pioneer, as the existence of the OLK years earlier indicates women
once had a presence in military branches. For this specific time, though, Lewandowska was among
the first women to volunteer. The patriotism inspiring this decision would last through the
remainder of her life and represents her belief that country came first.
Lewandowska’s military career was brief, though she rose to the rank of a Second
Lieutenant. The specifics of her unit’s capture in Soviet-controlled territory during September of
1939 are unknown.91 Existing stories detailing Lewandowska’s plane being shot down and her
capture as a result are heroic and popular, but the veracity of them is questionable.92 The ensuing
transports to the Soviet prisoner of war camps, first to Oshtokav and then to Kozielsk, were some
of the final voyages she took. Just over six months later, Janina Lewandowska boarded another
moving vehicle, this time taking her to an execution site deep in the Katyń Forest.
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CHAPTER TWO: “JEANNE D’ARC REINCARNATED”:
LEWANDOWSKA’S PRESENCE AND LEGACY IN THE KOZIELSK CAMP
Janina Lewandowska glanced around, checking to ensure none of the Soviet guards were
close enough to observe her covert work. Satisfied that no one could see, she mixed a small amount
of flour, salt, and water together on a kitchen table.93 She carried the hopes of imprisoned, faithful
Poles as she worked quietly. If all went according to plan, she would leave the kitchen that night
with a small number of wafers to use in a celebration of the Eucharist.94 She risked much by
furthering spiritual life in the Kozielsk camp, directly disobeying religious restrictions issued by
the guards. Recalling the group of imprisoned priests sentenced to solitary confinement for
continuing to hold masses, Lewandowska knew a similar punishment awaited her if caught.95 If
the risks scared her, she hid this well, directing her efforts towards her sacred mission. Finishing
the task at hand, she gathered together the completed wafers. Stepping out of the kitchen into the
cold night air, she headed to her cabin. She passed the structures housing approximately five
thousand other Poles, many captured within a month of the commencement of World War II
hostilities.96 In her hands she carried the spiritual food that would renew the fighting spirit in her
93
Rev. Msgr. Zdzisław Peszkowski, Memoirs of a Prisoner of War in Kozielsk, 2nd ed., trans. Anna
Marianska (Warszawa, Poland: Hector, Printing and Publishing House, 1993), 23.
94

Łukasz Zalesiński, “Metal Plane,” Polska Zbrojna, April 2020 Special Edition,
https://zbrojni.blob.core.windows.net/pzdata2/TinyMceFiles/jednodniowka_katyn_04_2020_ang.pdf, accessed
December 19, 2020, 5.
95
S. Swianiewicz, “Chapter II: Three Camps: Kozielsk, Starobielsk, Ostashkov, Section 2. Personal
Memoirs of Survivors, Religious life in the camp,” in The Crime of Katyn: Facts and Documents, 5th ed. (London:
Polish Cultural Foundation, 1989), 29.
96

Wojciech Materski, Katyn: A Crime Without Punishment, ed. Anna M. Cienciala and Natalia S.
Lebedeva (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 29, ProQuest Ebook Central.

36

37
fellow imprisoned Poles, reminding them of their homeland during this captivity in the desolate
Kozielsk Soviet prisoner of war (POW) camp.
Polish soldiers taken prisoner by the Soviet forces during the September 1939 campaign
found themselves sent to one of several camps, including Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Oshtokav.
Located near the Eastern border of Soviet Russia, these POW camps held approximately 15,000
Polish soldiers and officers.97 One-third of the prisoners held in these particular POW camps in
mid-1941 became the victims of the Katyń massacre. The Kozielsk and Starobielsk camps
predominantly contained officers in the Polish military, whereas the Ostashkov camp held officers
as well as Polish police and intelligence officers.98 Each of these camps was built on the grounds
of a Catholic monastery, and the Soviets converted monastery structures or chapels into housing
for their prisoners.99 The People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and affiliated guards
interviewed the prisoners, and then attempted to re-educate them by distributing Moscow
newspapers, news bulletins, and large printed propaganda.100 Polish POWs also engaged in
physical labor, digging roadways, tidying the camps, and transporting ice blocks and earth for
various NKVD projects.101 These conditions were the standard for Soviet-run prisoner of war
camps in the early 1940s.
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Since religion often involved gatherings, NKVD guards and supervisors were wary of its
presence in the camp. They worried that worship could allow POWs to plan and stage a revolt. To
prevent these gatherings, guards regularly patrolled the camp and checked inconspicuous bushes
for hidden worshippers.102 The dedication to examining any possible gathering demonstrates how
seriously guards took the presence of religion. These searches accompanied the removal of highranking religious officials before major holidays. This extreme action was not the first time the
NKVD punished religious leaders, having sent several priests into solitary confinement for
ignoring these directives. Separating prisoners from their religious leaders palpably impacted the
morale of those remaining, with one prisoner comparing the experience to being orphaned.103 This
weakening of spirit indicates that POWs relied on the religious presence to strengthen their resolve
and resist the efforts of the Soviet guards.
The Soviets also attempted to reeducate the Poles in these camps, making them sympathetic
to Communist beliefs. The Poles’ active faith life posed a threat to this work. While religions like
Christianity attribute a power and benevolence to God, Soviet Russia attempted to characterize
Communist party figures like Joseph Stalin as all-powerful. It was difficult to convince the faithful
to abandon their established beliefs, setting up a conflict between clergy members and Communist
party leaders.104 The Communist state preached atheism, a politically conducive identity that
allowed them to exert a greater influence over their citizens. Though Stalinist propaganda in
newspapers and radio broadcasts attempted to further these re-education efforts, religion continued
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to pose a barrier to the Soviets’ success.105 Stanislav Swianiewicz, a prisoner of Katyń, cited his
faith as one central reason for surviving the camp experience.106 Though Swianiewicz’s experience
may not represent the sentiments of all prisoners, it reveals a prevailing mentality in the camps.
These spiritual beliefs gave the POWs a source of renewal for their mental strength in resisting
Soviet reeducation efforts. Praying to their God gave the soldiers solace and courage to remain
loyal to their home country despite their imprisonment. With the strength of the POWs’
convictions, the Soviets were correct to perceive religion as a threat to their agenda. In the absence
of these religious leaders or the ability to convene, the sense of loss left prisoners more vulnerable
to the Soviet pressures.
Soviet efforts to prevent formal group religious worship succeeded, but they struggled to
effectively prevent individual prayers and more informal participation in religious life. In
removing these demonstrations of faith, camp authorities showed their lack of comprehension for
the religious dedication of the Poles. Even without clear leaders, both Jewish and Christian Polish
prisoners worshipped their God and found solace in each other’s presence. Since the guards strictly
enforced the prohibition on religious celebrations, prisoners adapted their worship. Originally,
prisoners shared a communal prayer each evening but made this practice more individualized as
time progressed. Rather than praying aloud, those kept in these cramped quarters adopted a few
minutes of silence.107 During this time, prisoners could pray to their God for their intentions. Each

105

S. Swianiewicz, “Chapter II: Three Camps: Kozielsk, Starobielsk, Ostashkov, Section 2. Personal
Memoirs of Survivors, The NKVD team at work,” 23.
106

Elizabeth V. Haigh, Stanisław Swianiewicz : Eulogy, Stanisław Swianiewicz collection, Saint Mary’s
University Patrick Power Library, Halifax, NS, http://library2.smu.ca/handle/01/26729#.X5dsui9h3GI, accessed
October 26, 2020.
107

S. Swianiewicz, “Chapter II: Three Camps: Kozielsk, Starobielsk, Ostashkov, Section 2. Personal
Memoirs of Survivors, Religious life in the camp,” 29.

40
prisoner prayed individually while surrounded by other who did the same, allowing them to
experience the same sort of communal sensation they knew from prior services. One prisoner noted
the incorporation of whispered song, another adaptation from usual worship practice.108 Despite
lacking the full-volume expressions of praise, prisoners used these moments to connect to each
other and their religion. These adapted practices were almost undetectable to Soviet guards. The
Poles did not lose their religious sentiments but made necessary changes to stay true to those
figures that assisted their people throughout history.
Jewish prisoner Salomon Slowes’ reflection on the psychological effects of the Kozielsk
housing conditions demonstrates how important maintaining religious practices was for the POWs.
Slowes wrote that many of the prisoners living in the main residence, a converted chapel, “were
driven into an even deeper state of depression,” due to the conditions, and that, “[he] was overtaken
by a feeling of hell on earth whenever [he] found [himself] in that place, and flickers of dancing
fire in the gloom would conjure, Dante’s words: ‘Abandon all hope, ye who enter here.’”109 The
irony of a Catholic chapel evoking a sense of hell in its inhabitants underscores how the communal
evening prayer allowed these prisoners to reclaim a vital part of their identity that the Soviets
attempted to suppress during Kozielsk captivity. These brief moments each evening helped combat
the sense of depression and desolation, nourishing the Poles’ fighting spirit.
The religious identities in Kozielsk reflected the percentages of the larger Polish nation.
Historian Simon Schochet found that 15% of the total prisoners held in the Kozielsk, Starobielsk,
and Oshtokav, were Jewish. At Kozielsk specifically, there were 200 Jewish prisoners, or about
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5% of the total.110 These soldiers continued to worship in secret, despite NKVD efforts to prohibit
such practices through impromptu searches of gathering spaces in the camp. When the NKVD
removed high-ranking religious figures shortly before Christmas Eve, 1939, they included the
Chief Rabbi of the Polish army in their roundup.111 Despite the knowledge that Christmas had
more significance to the Christian soldiers and that Hannukah had already passed, the NKVD took
no chances, locking the religious leaders in a tower before removing them from the camp.112
The Soviets did not separate soldiers based on their faith, housing both Christian and
Jewish service people in the same Church structure. Although this decision came from a need to
maximize space, it also made it more difficult for sects to gather and worship according to their
own specific traditions. The prisoners would need to overcome dogmatic differences to celebrate
religious ceremonies. A different structure held non-military Jewish prisoners, including doctors
and intellectuals.113 Presumably this division assisted with organizational efforts and roundups of
the different groups of prisoners for deportation. The Soviets later removed these individuals when
they converted the Kozielsk camp into an officer’s camp, sending them to other POW camps in
Western Russia. Since prisoners without a military connection were the only ones kept separate,
the basis for the housing distinction was the prisoner’s occupation, not their religion. To the
Soviets, the specifics of a prisoner’s religion did not matter much in their overall camp structure.
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With the limited space, the majority of prisoners and low-ranking officers received the same
consideration for placement. The Soviets seemed to have more concerns about separating generals
from lieutenants than Christians from Jews. Though the religious identities were an issue, officer
classifications posed a greater threat to Soviet efforts to control their new prisoners. Keeping ranks
separate prevented the Polish military hierarchy from organizing and rising up in the camps.
Although the Soviets paid attention to the threats religion posed, it was not their foremost concern
in the organization of the camp.
Although the exact percentage is not known, the preponderance of individuals in the
Kozielsk POW camp were Catholic, as evident in Jewish prisoner Salomon W. Slowes’
observation that, “Catholic religious consciousness was deeply entrenched among the
prisoners.”114 As a member of a different faith community, Slowes’ comments offer the benefit of
having fewer biases than reflections by a Catholic prisoner. The dedication to a faith life was not
simply present but actually engrained in the prisoners’ mentalities. Catholic prisoners in particular
took risks to adapt their worship life to the conditions of the camp. Using natural resources, such
as tree bark, the more artistic of the soldiers carved images of Mary and Jesus.115 The subject
matter reflects the larger Polish narrative, indicating that while imprisoned, these soldiers turned
to the spiritual figures they worshipped throughout their lives.
Zdzisław Peszkowski, a young soldier held in Kozielsk, documented the effect that the
presence of religious leaders had on prisoners in the camp. He recollects that after the removal of
the priests in Kozielsk, “We were so terribly orphaned. While they were among us you could
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always go up to them during a walk, make your confession, talk, and you’d feel better.”116
Religious life in the camp depended on these seemingly innocuous walks that guards permitted,
unaware that they allowed for their charges to connect, retaining their religious values and
dedication to Poland. The removal devastated the rest of the prisoners, and this likening to orphans
indicates the depth of the guidance provided by these religious leaders. These men could ease the
consciences of afflicted soldiers, provide a listening ear for concerns or anxieties, and always bring
them back to their Catholic beliefs, invoking a connection to their homeland in the process.
Religion, however discretely celebrated, constituted an important part of life in Kozielsk, and the
removal of known figureheads dealt a heavy blow to those remaining.
As a large part of Catholic worship is the celebration of the Eucharist, imprisoned Catholic
Poles worked to fulfil this part of their faith. The abandonment of elaborate rituals that accompany
transubstantiation during Mass was necessary, though not ideal. Commonplace items as tumblers
and saucers replaced chalices and patens, but these substitutions did not dampen the spirit and
determination of the Catholic faithful to commune with God.117 To bring these moments to
fruition, Kozielsk prisoners relied on a variety of strategies to acquire the necessary components
for the bread and wine elements. The fruit ingredients, such as grapes—or, more likely raisins,
with fruit a luxury118—were rare gifts from sympathetic guards.119 To obtain other ingredients,
prisoners utilized connections to employees in the kitchens, placing their trust in men and women
that could easily inform their Soviet superiors. Some prisoners resorted to theft to acquire the key
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supplies.120 Even these techniques involved fewer risks in comparison to the prisoners who used
their direct access to the kitchens as part of their forced labor to secretly bake wafers for Eucharistic
services.121 Such dedication serves as a reminder of these prisoners’ devotion to God, as the NKVD
banned religious displays of any sort and were quick to take retaliatory action.
The Eucharist receives the majority of attention during worship services. Its distribution is
standard for all churches, even if the wine is not offered to the faithful in attendance. As such,
acquiring the flour to create the wafers was central to underground Catholic life in Kozielsk. The
effort put into gathering the flour, whether stolen or gifted to the prisoners, reflected their
dedication to turning the simplest ingredients into one of the holiest components in their worship
practice. When Zdzisław Peszkowski asked, in Polish, for some flour to make communion wafers,
a Soviet kitchen staff member with limited Polish vocabulary, “stopped for a moment and then
without a word he brought the flour.”122 It took a second for this employee to translate the Polish
request and then to comprehend its weight.
Though impossible to know all of the thoughts that ran through this Russian guard’s mind
during the brief pause that Peszkowski observed, the pause itself points to a greater inner conflict.
To give the flour to a prisoner constituted a conscious violation of the anti-religious position of the
camp and could result in punishment at the hands of the NKVD. His eventual gift of the flour to
Peszkowski shows that there were sympathetic Russians employed in the camps. The expression
of these sentiments was discrete by necessity so as to avoid trouble from Soviet guards. It also
points to the power conveyed in Peszkowski’s simple request of flour for communion wafers.123
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Despite the language barrier, this man recognized both the literal words spoken as well as their
significance for the prisoner. It is impossible to tell whether the eventual submission came from
sympathy for this poor Polish prisoner or from a fear of retribution from his perception of a Divine
Power, but the result was the same, and the flour changed hands.
Simply possessing flour was not enough to hold a Mass, as its form needed to carry at least
some similarity to the wafers these Poles saw in their home parishes. Turning the flour into a wafer
of some sort was not an easy task, and their efforts to do so early on in their imprisonment reflect
inspiration from their Jewish compatriots. As Peszkowski notes in his memoirs, these improvised
wafers, “were a bit like matzos but at least we had something.”124 Improvising Eucharistic wafers
in this manner was not ideal, but for these faithful prisoners, the ability to offer any bread product
to their God superseded adherence to traditional procedures. When Peszkowski writes that “at
least” the Catholic Poles had a makeshift wafer, he conveys a sense of settling for these matzo
wafers. The efforts of these prisoners in turning simple ingredients into a vessel to commune with
Christ Jesus was indicative of the dedication to their faith. There was also a poetic note to it all, in
that these Catholics connected with traditions learned from Jewish Poles as well as Catholicism’s
development from Judaism—the harsh reality of the prison camps could not overtake the strength
of these religions.
Although the Catholic prisoners managed to produce matzo-wafers, records indicate that
their celebration of the Eucharist was inconsistent. Part of the challenge was the acquisition of the
resources and production of wafers, both lengthy processes considering NKVD scrutiny. The other
challenge came with the deportation of the priests, the only ordained individuals who could
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facilitate the transubstantiation of these wafers into the Body of Christ. Since religious leaders
were present until Christmas of 1939, it follows that they were the ones leading the Catholic
masses. After the deportation, however, the soldiers did not cease their worship. As with the
modifications made to the wafer considering the circumstances, the soldiers understood that there
was a certain amount of adaptation that needed to occur. The Christmas Eve mass, documented by
Zdzisław Peszkowski, involved consumption of a special Eucharistic wafer, despite it not being
consecrated by a priest.125 The Poles preferred a modified Eucharistic sacrament to no sacrament
at all. They managed to continue some religious celebration despite setbacks by NKVD antireligious policy.
While many details of Lewandowska’s life are contested, all accounts agree on at least one
fact—that she was an active participant in the secret religious life in Kozielsk. Her involvement
went beyond simply appearing at the Masses or conversing on doctrine with fellow soldiers, as she
worked to bake the wafers used in the Eucharistic rite.126 This fact reveals that she worked in the
kitchens of Kozielsk in some capacity, which allowed her to produce the wafers, or at least hold
some involvement in the process. Such work did not go unnoticed by the camp guards, and she
underwent multiple searches of her room and person as they worked to determine how their
prisoners managed to subvert anti-religious regulations and efforts within the camp.127 Her
dedication to the religious life of the camp was as strong as that of her compatriots; she lived in a
separate physical space from the rest of the prisoners simply due to her sex, but this did not keep
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her from assisting and gathering with other Catholics in the camp. 128 The barriers put in place by
the NKVD and camp guards could not prevent their prisoners from continuing to participate in
traditions they committed to heart.
These actions in producing Eucharistic matzo wafers had an overt religious connection, as
her work directly allowed for worship services to continue and for Catholic prisoners to participate
in the rites they grew up with, along with a more symbolic connection between Lewandowska and
the Virgin Mary. Just as Mary brought Christ Jesus into the world and allowed for the Divine to
directly engage with His creation, Lewandowska’s work in the kitchens of Kozielsk brought the
Christ into contact with these Poles. Though it is difficult to say whether other prisoners involved
in these underground services adopted this perspective, it does mirror the national ideals that
mothers raise good, patriotic, and Catholic citizens.129 The connection between Mary and the
Matka Polska is not coincidence, since Marian devotion constitutes a large component of Polish
religious life. In assisting with the production of these Eucharistic matzo wafers, Lewandowska
helped keep Catholic worship alive and a part of these soldiers’ lives, in a certain sense fulfilling
her duty as a Polish woman to raise and instill in others a devotion to God and to Poland. Her work
did not follow this societal expectation to the letter, as she was not a mother by virtue of bearing
children, but in adopting this title symbolically she helped imprisoned soldiers maintain their
religious devotion and nationalism in the Kozielsk camp.
In addition to her work in the Kozielsk camp assisting with the production and distribution
of the Eucharistic matzo-wafers, Lewandowska continued to fulfil the socially mandated role of
nurturing patriotic spirit through her sheer presence. As Zdzisław Peszkowski, another active
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prisoner in the Eucharistic matzo-wafer production, notes, “Real awareness that Janina was among
us awoken some sort of warm familial feelings. This reminded us of our dearest home and family
- one woman and we longing for Poland. This intimate longing, each separate and all together.”130
The repeated use of the “we” and “us” indicates that her presence affected both those she worked
with and those she simply encountered in the day-to-day camp life. She reminded these men of
home and family; and these were more than happy memories, they were the reasons that these
soldiers enlisted and chose to fight for their country. Certainly, a part of this reminder involved
thoughts of wives and children, but the greater connection was to Poland. Though soldiers could
write letters home, between censors and camp procedures, there was no guarantee that their loved
ones would receive or be able to respond to the messages.131
Lewandowska’s presence was a reminder of home, and through it, each of these soldiers
felt a renewed connection to Poland, reinforcing a motivation and desire to serve their country
with pride through whatever hardships they experienced. After seeing Lewandowska in the camp,
Slowes reflected, “onlookers came away with the feeling that Jeanne d’Arc had been reincarnated
in their midst.”132 The allusion to another female whose inclusion in the military was
groundbreaking demonstrates the symbolic role Lewandowska held. Joan of Arc famously rallied
the French soldiers to fight for their country, something Lewandowska also did through her various
efforts. There is little evidence that Polish citizens outside of those imprisoned knew of
Lewandowska’s presence in the Kozielsk camp; her primary impact was on her fellow prisoners.
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Similar to Joan of Arc, Lewandowska used her faith to unite other soldiers around their home
country. Religious belief is tied to patriotism, an association present in the defined Matka Polka
role. Assisting with matzo-wafer production allowed Lewandowska to keep other prisoners’ spirit
up, furthering a sense of community despite harsh conditions and NKVD rules about gatherings.
This comparison to the saintly French soldier reflects her effectiveness at doing this, since Joan of
Arc succeeded at uniting the French army, boosting morale, and securing victories for her country.
Though Lewandowska’s work took place in a POW camp, she managed to maintain a sense of
community despite the misery in Kozielsk.
Lewandowska was an anomaly in the Polish air force and in the Soviets’ eyes, though this
fact did not contribute to her execution in the Katyń Forest. Her efforts in supporting other POWs,
reminding them of home and furthering a covert religious life to spiritually reinvigorate other
prisoners, were short-lived. From the affixing of Stalin’s signature to the execution order in March
1940, Lewandowska’s fate was sealed.133 It was not her work making and distributing Eucharist
wafers that led her to a grave in the Katyń forest, but her classification as an officer based on her
military title of 2nd Lieutenant. The only prisoners left in Kozielsk were officers, though their
specific ranks varied. Believing freedom was near, Lewandowska boarded the trains with hundreds
of other Polish POWs. No liberation awaited at the end of the railroad tracks, only a forest
disturbed by recently dug, partially filled graves. Marched to the edge of one such pit containing
her comrades’ bodies in April of 1940, Lewandowska’s final thoughts are left to the
imagination.134 To the Soviets that held her in place while the executioner readied his gun, she was
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simply another prisoner to execute.135 Moments after the gunshot rang out, gravity pulled her body
into the grave, and the NKVD team proceeded on with the next prisoner. Deep in the Katyń forest,
Lewandowska’s body soon lay hidden from the world—at least, that was the Soviets’ hope.
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CHAPTER THREE: WHEN THE JOURALISTS REMOVED THEIR HATS:
THE DISCOVERY AND IMPLICATIONS OF LEWANDOWSKA’S BODY
Silence fell over the crowd gathered around a recently unearthed set of bodies. The mass
graves discovered by the Germans in the Katyń forest in 1943 promised to give the journalists
present a story that would increase circulation numbers and earn them the approval of their editors.
The German authorities believed that by allowing journalists to write about their experience at the
graves, international opposition to Nazi policies would lessen and the new focus on a Soviet
massacre would weaken the Allies’ relationship with the Soviet Union. All of these hopes
dissipated in one unexpected moment, as the graveside workers uncovered a female body in
uniform. The German hypothesis, that Jewish-Bolsheviks killed these Polish officers, did not take
into account any possibility of a female officer.136 Lewandowska’s presence threatened to
undermine the German’s storyline; after all, no one at that graveside imagined a woman could
serve as an air force pilot in the Polish military.137
In June of 1941, Nazi Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, invading Soviet Russia
and breaking the Molotov-Rippentrop Nonaggression Pact. By July of that year German forces
had conquered the Smolensk territory, home of the Katyń forest. Early in 1943, a German officer
heard rumors of a mass grave in the forest, interrogated local Russians to determine if the
whisperings had any truth to them, led an exploratory dig to confirm the presence of bodies, and
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then informed his superiors.138 The German government ordered the opening of the Katyń graves
on March 29, 1943.139 As initial reports crossed the desk of the Minister of Nazi Propaganda,
Joseph Gobbels, he realized the opportunity this discovery offered. If they could prove it was a
Soviet-perpetrated massacre, the Nazis could drive a wedge between the Allied forces, weakening
them just enough to ensure a German victory. Eleven days later, on April 9, Goebbels received
approval to send delegations to the Katyń site with the intention of using its findings for
propaganda purposes.140 A strategically scheduled news bulletin on April 13, 1943, briefly
informed the world of the discovery of mass grave pits in the forest. There was little additional
information, as the German investigation was still in its early stages. Pursuit of the truth was
secondary to turning the investigation into a theatrical display for the global community.
The Germans spread this news in an effort to undermine alliances with the Soviet
government. The alliance between the “Big Three” during the Second World War was one of
unease and borne from a sense of necessity. The Stalinist regime did not hold the same values as
either the American or British governments. With the German invasion into Soviet territory, the
British sought a military alliance with their former rival in order to defeat Hitler. The basis for this
decision was purely strategic, an effort to increase pressure on the Nazi forces, now that the conflict
was a two-front war.141 During the period of negotiation as to the terms of alliance, tensions
became apparent between the British and Soviet diplomats. While the British focused on the taskat-hand, the Soviets used this outreach to reimagine the post-world balance of powers. Given the
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urgency of defeating the Nazis, Stalin’s demand that the 1941 Soviet borders (which included parts
of Eastern Poland) obtain international recognition, though not preferred by the Allies, received
consideration nonetheless.142
Across the ocean, the Americans had even more difficulty entering into an alliance with
the Soviets. The United States officially recognized the Soviet Union in 1933, but a lingering
animosity remained. This lack of trust influenced the U.S. foreign policy with the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR), making any attempt at a military alliance more difficult. According
to historian Lothar Ketterman, the long-term effects of such an agreement with the Soviets would
“lead the United States to climb down from the Olympian heights of their ideological principles
into the depths of European realities.”143 As the Chief Coordinator of British Propaganda, Bruce
Lockart, noted, the American citizens were “even more anti-Russian than our own Tory diehards.”144 The prevalence of this distrust of Russia demonstrates how any American alliance with
the Soviets was one born of necessity. Allying with Soviet Russia was a strategic decision meant
to bring about the defeat of Hitler. The Soviets also had their concerns with the alliance, not
completely trusting in their counterparts. Their unease came from a heightened paranoia that the
British in particular withheld some support so as to encourage the Germans and Soviets to destroy
each other.145 Such mutual destruction would remove two threats to Western Europe, and this
thought remained in the Soviets’ mind throughout the negotiation. In essence, the alliance did not
have the most auspicious beginnings.
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The Nazis recognized tensions between the Allies and hoped to use the Katyń massacre to
their advantage. While they knew it was unlikely they could separate the Americans and British,
there was room to maximize the rifts with the Soviets. Their hope was that, when presented with
undeniable evidence that the Soviets massacred Polish officers, the British and Americans would
sever ties with the Soviets. They based this assumption on the 1929 Geneva Convention, which
established standards for the treatment of POWs, including sanitary housing conditions and
consistent access to religious services.146 Along with these rights, the Convention prohibited the
executions of POWs without a trial and notification to a protecting power—which the Russians
did not do before carrying out the massacre.147 Since the Russians were not signatories of the 1929
Geneva Convention, they did not technically violate this predominant international law.148 Despite
this technicality, the wide acceptance of the standards set out in this convention put the Soviets in
a difficult position if the world discovered their actions. Pressure from the international community
to denounce such a massacre could lead allies to question their connections to Soviet Russia. The
Polish government-in-exile, comprised of many prominent Polish politicians and military officials,
established itself in the friendly city of London. With the close proximity to the Polish leadership,
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the Germans expected the British would support the Poles, and the U.S. would jump at the chance
to abandon the Soviets.149 Yet in order for this plan to succeed, the Germans needed to form a
compelling case that left no room for doubt that the Soviets perpetrated this massacre. If
unsuccessful, the Germans would remain in a two-front war against strategically united enemies.
That alliance meant an almost certain defeat for the Nazis, and this sense of urgency motivated
their propaganda efforts.
The German government furthered their propagandist agenda by calling upon impartial
international bodies to conduct independent examinations of the evidence. Both the Poles and the
Germans requested that the International Red Cross (IRC) lead an investigation on April 17.150
The IRC responded that they would only investigate if asked by all the parties involved, in this
case, Soviet Russia, Germany, and Poland. Soviet Russia made their vehement opposition to this
request clear by severing diplomatic ties with the Polish government-in-exile, leaving the Germans
scrambling to find a secondary agency they could use.151 They settled on the International Medical
Commission, granting them absolute freedom in examining the graves and bodies as they saw fit
and writing an independent final report.152 In addition, the Germans welcomed a Polish delegation
made up of representatives of the clergy, writers, the consul, and members of the Polish Red
Cross.153
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While these Polish individuals confirmed the credibility of the German hypothesis within
Polish circles, the Germans sought to develop additional international support. They invited
journalists from eight “neutral countries” (Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Holland, Belgium,
Hungary, Norway and Serbia) to tour the Katyń graves, accompanied by a representative of the
Reich Press Department and the Secretary of the Foreign Office.154 Though these journalists
appeared independent, the German government invited them strategically. The Nazis either
occupied or had close governmental ties to six of the countries.155 Inviting journalists was simply
another carefully calculated component of maximizing propaganda related to the massacre.
Though these individuals had some freedom to wander the site, these German representatives
accompanied them for much of their visit, acting to step in and assist them with making any
connections between the grave site and the Soviet forces.
Nazi propaganda blamed Jewish-Bolsheviks for the massacre of Polish officers. Midway
through April 1943, a startling discovery challenged this narrative. Polish writer Joseph
Mackiewicz recollected that moments after the uncovering of Janina Lewandowska’s body, “all
the journalists took off their hats though they had not thought to accord that homage to the
thousands of murdered men. The Russian prisoners employed at the digging also stopped their
work and peered curiously into the grave…A flutter of excitement broke out amongst the
journalists, but the Germans remained silent in blank astonishment.”156 The reactions of surprise
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from those gathered in the Katyń forest reflects internalized gender expectations relating to
military service. Poles, Russians, and Germans witnessed this uncovering, all aware that the
victims were Polish, and all shocked to see a woman’s body in the graves. Their surprise only
intensified when they saw that she wore an officer’s uniform.
Hoping that a successful propaganda campaign around the discovery of these mass graves
could result in fracturing the Allies’ already-tenuous relationship with Soviet Russia, the Germans
feared the discovery of a woman’s body would undermine and/or discredit their assertions about
the Soviet role. As observer Joseph Mackiewicz explained, the German forces present
were taken aback and extremely worried by the discovery of a woman’s body in
the Katyn graves…They were afraid that the utter improbability of a female body
being found in a mass grave supposed to contain the bodies of Polish officers,
without any clue to how it got there, would cast new doubts and undermine the
authority of their version of the discoveries, which until now had seemed to fit the
facts so wonderfully. They would have to issue a commentary which they were
unable to supply.157
The Germans needed to present overwhelmingly credible evidence of Soviet transgressions to have
any chance of driving a wedge between the United States, Great Britain, and Soviet Russia. A
woman’s presence in a mass grave of officers seemed so far-fetched that the Germans feared it
would weaken their case. If these mass graves only held Polish citizens, the Germans could use
her presence as an example of the ruthlessness of the Soviet executioners. However, having already
labeled it as an officer’s grave, the Germans only expected male bodies, since few women served
in active military roles during the early stages of the war. Convinced that this evaluation was
correct, the Germans present at the grave sites feared Lewandowska’s body was evidence of
tampered graves. Rather than believe that Polish women were members of military services, the
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Germans clung to preconceived notions. Lewandowska’s body threatened their version of events
and necessitated a coverup by the German forces in Katyń.
Fearing the press would not believe their propaganda after the discovery of this body,
Mackiewicz recalled that, “one of [the Germans] broke away from the group and hurried to the
field telephone in a neighboring hut. That evening they tried to turn the discovery into a mere
bagatelle and draw the attention of the correspondents to other things.”158 The immediate actions
taken by the Germans reveals how concerning this discovery was. In downplaying the discovery
and shifting attention, the Germans shaped Lewandowska’s legacy for the next fifty-four years.
The only people who knew about the discovery of Lewandowska’s body were the journalists, the
Germans, and the forensic scientists. As many of the reporters belonged to countries with some
affiliation to Germany, the Nazis could easily convince them to drop the story if it threatened
German stature.
The neutral states, such as Switzerland, chose to wait until after German newspapers shared
their articles. This deference allowed the Swiss to weigh their observations against the German
press releases. It is unclear why exactly the Swiss journalist did not publish his article immediately
upon his return from the graves, though historian Krystyna Piórkowska indicates that there was an
additional conflict between the journalist and the editors about the timing of publication.159 The
editors appeared to want to wait until the Germans began sharing news before releasing any
journalistic content. In addition, the threat of retaliation for disagreeing with the country presiding
over the investigation was certainly a factor in this decision. This sentiment against speaking out
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about the massacre lingered into the 1980s, as the Soviet influence over post-war Poland silenced
any discussions of Katyń in the media.160
Thus, Lewandowska did not receive any attention from the press, and her body simply
became known as a “pilot corpse” in official reports—a description devoid of any reference to
sex.161 Found near the top of one mass grave, where the bodies had a mummified quality due to
properties of the soil, Lewandowska’s body was fairly easy to recognize as female.162 This
classification gave the outward impression that her body was no different from the rest. The only
way to know a female body was present in the graves was to have first-hand experience viewing
the body. The title of “pilot corpse” was vague enough to conceal the most discreditable detail to
their hypothesis, the body’s sex. When listed on an exhumation record, this classification would
not merit a second glance, helping to conceal the body from other curious eyes. As such, the
Germans were able to downplay the discovery.
The Germans also avoided answering the difficult questions about the presence of her body
among the graves. They believed that she was not a military officer and thus needed to suppress
knowledge of her presence. If the Germans knew that Polish women participated in the military
from the beginning of the conflict, her discovery would not have been an issue. Their panicked
response indicates the widespread belief that women were not members, much less officers, of the
Polish military. Soviet women had served in military roles throughout the Second World War, but
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the Germans did not expect the same with Polish women. They knew that Polish feminine identity
did not easily translate into military participation. This knowledge contributed to the initial panic
that this mass grave did not fit their hypothesis and led to efforts to conceal the discovery.
The finding of these graves horrified the Poles, who spent years trying to locate the
thousands of missing Polish POWs now recognized as victims of a Soviet-perpetrated massacre.
Between 1941 and 1943, the Polish Government-in-Exile used their re-established diplomatic
relationship with the Soviets to seek answers on the whereabouts of the prisoners known to have
been in the Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Oshtokav POW camps.163 In November of 1941, the Polish
ambassador to Moscow, Stanisław Kot, met with Soviet leader Josef Stalin who told Kot clearly
that he did not know where the prisoners war were, and that, “they have escaped…to
Manchuria.”164 Stalin’s response set the tone for the following two years, though his attempts to
prevent the Poles from learning about the deportations and executions of these officers wore away
at Polish patience. Frustration with the Soviet government built throughout 1941 and 1942 as the
war continued and the approximately 5,000 of Polish POWs remained “lost”. Tensions between
the countries reached their peak with the German discovery of the graves, culminating in the
breaking-off of diplomatic relations in April 1943.165 The Poles’ request that the International Red
Cross investigate the massacre inspired the Soviets’ retaliatory action. Their theatrical indignation
did not distract the Poles, who grew increasingly frustrated with their one-time allies. They
expected that with their new military alliance, the Soviets would release all previously captured
POWs to help fight in the war against Hitler. Between the German evidence and their underlying
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mistrust of the Soviets, the Poles readily held the Soviets responsible, and expected their allies
would do the same.
The Nazi propaganda was ultimately unsuccessful in driving a wedge between the Allied
Forces, despite the frustration of the Polish government-in-exile. Both United States President
Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed that despite
the fact the Soviets likely committed the massacre, their alliance was essential to victory over Nazi
Germany. Churchill forwarded a report to Roosevelt on the Katyń massacre by Sir Owen
O’Malley, British Ambassador to the Polish government-in-exile. This mutual exchange of
information pertaining to the massacre indicates that these men worked to respond in a productive
manner. Though they did not address the massacre unilaterally, each worked within their
respective governments in addition to the Polish government-in-exile to reduce any blowback to a
revelation that would complicate their alliance with Soviet Russia.
In this report, O’Malley indicated his belief that based on the evidence Soviets were not
innocent. In the letter, he also commented on the alliance with Stalin. “In handling the publicity
side of the Katyn affair,” he wrote, “we have been constrained by the urgent need for cordial
relations with the Soviet Government to appear to appraise the evidence with more hesitation and
lenience than we should do in forming a common-sense judgement on events occurring in normal
times or in the ordinary course of our private lives.”166 Maintaining friendly relations with the
Soviet government was more important than soothing Polish anxieties and anger. Historian Robert
Szymczak explains that comparatively, the Soviet government could do more than the Polish
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government in the conflict with Nazi Germany.167 This evaluation heavily factored into the
responses of the British and American governments to the massacre. Confronted by the Polish
Prime Minister about the Soviet-perpetrated atrocity, Winston Churchill notably replied, “If they
are dead nothing you can do will bring them back.” 168 A few days later, Churchill reiterated his
commitment to prioritize war efforts over resolving the questions of the massacre to the Soviet
Ambassador, stating, “We have got to beat Hitler…and this is no time for quarrels and charges.”169
The blunt nature of Churchill’s response indicates the strength of his conviction that passing public
judgement on the Soviets’ crimes could wait.
In the United States, Roosevelt attempted to keep knowledge of the massacre quiet,
preventing Admiral William Standley from investigating the Nazi claims about it.170 Roosevelt did
not engage with the Nazi propaganda surrounding the massacre in any official capacity, standing
with Churchill in the decision to fight with the Soviets. Privately, Roosevelt expressed doubts that
the Soviets committed the crime, believing that the Germans were responsible. However, this
commentary does not seem to have quantifiably impacted his policy of non-response.171
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Rather than accuse Stalin of perpetrating the Katyń massacre, the two powers focused on
attempting to reestablish diplomatic relations between Poland and Soviet Russia. In smoothing this
tension, the Allies hoped to avoid further weakening their alliance and efforts to defeat Hitler. The
two feared that a diplomatic break over the Soviet role in Katyń would lead Stalin to annex Polish
territory and create a new Soviet-backed Polish state. Roosevelt and Churchill privately informed
the Soviet leader they would not support such a government.172 The two also worked with the
Polish government-in-exile, pressuring the Poles to rectify the split with Russia on the Soviets’
terms.173 In a roundabout manner, the American and British governments addressed the aftereffects of the Katyń massacre rather than seriously investigating the crime itself. Doing so allowed
them to maintain their alliance and remain dedicated to defeating Hitler. By avoiding a direct
investigation, the two could plead ignorance to their respective citizens, minimizing protests and
calls for action against the Soviets. The Germans tried to put pressure on the already-tenuous
relationship between the Allied Powers through their propaganda efforts, but the governments
instead redoubled their efforts to maintain their alliance to defeat the Nazis. Ambassador O’Malley
reflected on the double-edged nature of this decision, writing that the British, “used the good name
of England like the murderers used the little conifers to cover up a massacre; and in view of the
immense importance of an appearance of Allied unity and of the heroic resistance of Russia to
Germany, few will think that any other course would have been wise or right.”174
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The Soviets recaptured the Smolensk territory in September of 1943. This control marked
the end of German exhumation and investigative efforts. The Soviets were eager to place blame
on the Germans and thus deflect responsibility. This intention is reflected in their investigation,
which did not incorporate impartial foreign validators of evidence and was far more opaque.175
While the Germans allowed forensic experts near absolute freedom to conduct their exhumation
work, the Soviets kept their experts under tight supervision.176 By this point in the 1943 Katyń
investigations, Lewandowska’s body was lost. With their international standing at stake, the
Soviets needed to skew any evidence they could to support their counterargument that this was a
German-perpetrated massacre. This Soviet hypothesis claimed that the massacre occurred in the
fall of 1941, when the Germans occupied the Smolensk territory. According to the theory, the
Germans then “discovered” and revealed the mass graves to the world to bolster flagging military
and political affairs in 1943.177 Though the Soviets had little physical evidence to support their
claim, the bullets used for the executions were German made. This detail was one of their strongest
arguments to place blame on the Germans. The NKVD executioners had indeed used Germanmade Walther PPK pistols when they executed the Poles because, first, the pistols were extremely
accurate, making them reliable tools for a mass killing. Second, as German-made weapons, they
also provided cover, since the Soviets could simply claim the Germans used their own weapons to
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kill the Poles.178 The Germans discovered this evidence during their investigation and did not find
it concerning. They believed that their ammunitions trade with the Soviets prior to the war was
common knowledge and rendered this particular detail innocuous to their overall blame of the
Soviets.
The Soviets turned to personal testimony in an attempt to sway foreign opinion during
carefully curated visits. During these demonstrations, the Soviets used women’s testimonies to
further legitimate their claims. Women living in the Smolensk territory shared their stories of the
early months in 1940, including details that incriminated the Germans as the perpetrators of the
massacre. United States Ambassador Averell Harriman recalled that, after one young woman’s
testimony, those gathered “were told that ‘the girls guessed without difficulty that the Germans
living in the dacha were engaged in killing.’”179 The Soviets evidently believed that using women
to express certain manipulated details would be more credible. Stating that the girls “guessed” that
the Germans conducted the executions instead of the Soviets gave the appearance that there was a
separation between the Soviet government and the investigation. The Soviet strategy was to rely
on these young women’s honesty and unimpeachable sense of duty. Women were the front people
of the Soviet narrative, and their version of Katyń as a German massacre relied heavily on their
ability to tell this story. Whereas the Germans shied away from referencing a female’s presence at
Katyń, the Soviets actively incorporated feminine voices. Janina Lewandowska’s body was in
uniform and challenged expectations for gendered domains of participation in the life and health
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of a nation. The women who testified, in contrast, worked in kitchens and the home, remaining in
a widely recognized space for females.
Subtle commentary on these women’s testimony points to another way in which the Soviets
managed to use the feminine identity to their advantage. The witnesses received introductions and
phrased their commentary in a self-deprecating way. They did not want to see these killings, but
due to their ‘feminine curiosity,’ they happened to look out the window at the moment of a Polish
officer’s execution (or confinement) by German forces.180 The Soviets exploited a pervasive belief
that women were curious to a fault to build veracity for their stories. These women did not actively
spy on the Germans to record each individual failure or crime and were not exaggerating any
details. What they saw stuck with them, leaving them with a certainty of German guilt. They had
no stake in whether it was a Soviet or German crime, and only sought to share their experience
with the visitors. Thus, the Soviets hoped to strengthen the credibility of their version of the Katyń
massacre.
The highly curated testimonies were not as effective as the Soviets hoped, coming across
as too “staged” to the visiting Spanish, Polish, Czech, and American parties.181 The American
ambassador specifically criticized the testimony as “glib.”182 The Poles in particular were
skeptical, and allies such as Britain and the United States agreed that the Soviet-supported narrative
seemed weak. Despite privately agreeing, the United Kingdom and United States were slow to
explicitly condemn the Soviets, prioritizing their alliance over the massacre. The British in
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particular simply stated that the best defense of Soviet innocence was producing the Polish soldiers
known to be held in the POW camps.183 Since victims’ personal effects were in the graves, it
quickly became apparent that these prisoners were the same ones known to be in Soviet POW
camps. Losing ground, the Soviets found themselves in a situation where much of Europe believed
they were guilty, even without a direct admission. The Soviet efforts to misconstrue evidence and
employ direct testimony failed. Their efforts to play on traditional gendered expectations could
not effectively distract the world from the truth. Exhumation of the bodies and identification efforts
continued relatively undisturbed throughout the rest of the war.
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CONCLUSION:
RETURNED TO HER HOMELAND
It was time. Lying on his deathbed in 1997, the famed Polish forensic scientist, Professor
Boleslaw Popielski felt confident he could reveal his secret. For the past fifty-two years, he had
kept six skulls of Katyń victims hidden from the prying eyes of Soviet and Polish secret police.184
Fearing punishment for discussing the massacre and manipulation of the facts by the Soviets,
Popielski remained silent.185 The only other person who knew about their existence was his longdeceased predecessor in the University of Wrocław Department of Forensic Science, Gerhard
Buhtz.186 Though the existence of these skulls was shocking enough, Popielski had one last
tantalizing detail to share: one of these remains was a woman’s.187 The efforts of both the German
and Soviet exhumations to hide the existence of a female victim in the Katyń graves slowly
unraveled with this revelation. After neglect in newspaper reports and intentional misclassification
in official documents, the process of formal identification of the only female body found in the
graves could begin.188
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After the initial discovery and identification of Lewandowska’s body in the mass graves in
1943, little is known about what happened to it next. Testimony from fellow prisoners in the
Kozielsk camp referenced a female POW, thought to be Lewandowska, though no concrete
evidence existed for public confirmation of this supposition. Sparse details of her life were also
available through these testimonies, but they do not appear to have had much impact on the overall
narrative of Katyń. If anything, these brief biographies cemented the public’s understanding of her
story- simple details of her family and presence in the camp.
Despite the absence of official confirmation that Janina Lewandowska perished at Katyń,
her family knew this was a strong possibility. Fellow internees, such as Dr. Wacław Mucho,
transferred from the Kozielsk camp prior to its liquidation, stated they encountered Lewandowska
in the camp.189 Coupled with the fact that she did not return home after the war, it became
increasingly obvious that she was another victim of the massacre. When news finally broke of the
female body in 1951, the strength of this supposition increased. Though there were no exhumation
details that formally identified the body as Lewandowska’s, a process of deduction led the family
to this conclusion. Individuals following news of the massacre arrived at the same conclusion,
though nobody could confirm whether the body found in the mass graves belonged to
Lewandowska. Without this information, the Polish nation did not begin the formal
memorialization process for the young officer.
The appearance of her skull in 1997, when Boleslaw Popielski made his revelation, was
the first physical evidence of her death in the massacre. By 2005, improved technology allowed
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for the next team that analyzed the skulls to confirm it was hers using a super projection method.190
Super projection is a forensic science process whereby a picture of the deceased is combined with
forensic markers on the body or skull to match and super-impose key genetic features to determine
whether or not it is a match. 191 Since the skull was separate from the rest of her body, those
working on the identification process had less to work with. They had to wait for developments in
the field, such as super projection, that would allow them to make an identification from just the
skull, which would have lengthened the final confirmation of her identity.
Lewandowska’s final burial in November 2005 included military honors.192 Present at the
burial was Henryk Gulbinowicz, the Cardinal of Wrocław, who stated that, “Janina Lewandowska,
lieutenant of the Polish Army pilot, the only woman prisoner of war murdered in Katyń, you have
returned to your homeland”.193 The cardinal’s words were consistent with the Polish narrative of
Katyń, in particular the idea of these soldiers returning home after a long “exile” in hostile territory.
Although identified as the only female victim, the process of the burial remained the same, her
military honors consistent with any veteran’s funeral. The distinct lack of press surrounding the
burial indicates that the family expressed a desire to keep the proceedings to themselves.
In the years after her burial, Janina Lewandowska continued to receive posthumous awards
and military promotions. In 2009, Polish President Lech Kaczyński ordered the promotion of all
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the victims in the Katyń massacre to honor their memory.194 For Lewandowska, this meant her
title became that of Lieutenant. Again, she did not receive any special commendation, remaining
just another victim of the massacre. This honor was important and further solidified the massacre
in the Polish mindset, but it did not have any special bearing on Lewandowska’s legacy. On a local
level, however, Lewandowska received the “Ad Perpetuam Rei Memoriam” posthumous
commemorative medal from the Wielkopolskie Voivodship.195 The Wielkopolskie Voivodship is
a province in Western Poland including cities like Kalisz, Konin, and the one where she learned
to fly, Poznan. This award, which roughly translates to an award for “perpetual memory,” indicates
how a local province paid homage to her sacrifice. Lewandowska’s active participation in the
Poznan aviation clubs contributed to her service in the Polish Air Force. This particular honor
recognizes the specific, formative connection between the province and the Second Lieutenant.
The story of Katyń intersects with the Matka Polka, though this connection does not hinge
on Janina Lewandowska’s presence. Instead, it indicates a national model of mourning, returning
to the partition period and martyrdom of Polish children. The Katyń Memorial at Wrocław features
a wounded, almost certainly dying, victim of Katyń cradled in a woman’s arms. While the man’s
body is emaciated and contorted, the woman sits upright, gazing imploringly at the angel of death,
who is posed feet away on an elevated slab. As Vanessa Fredericks describes this motherly figure,
“she has prepared her son for this fate. Her subservient position suggests that she is succumbing
to her own role in the narrative, and that is to accept that her sacrifice is contributing to a broader
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narrative that gives meaning to her suffering.”196 The Polish mother depicted by Adam Mickiewicz
in his 1831 poem thus connects to the maternal figure at this particular memorial. The mother is
seen, quite literally, to be “Gaz[ing] on the sword that cleaves her living heart” as she symbolically
holds all the victims of the Katyń massacre in her arms and looks at the angel of death above her.197
This memorial, constructed and unveiled to the public around the turn of the century, is evidence
that the Polish mother is still linked with the massacre at Katyń. The lingering connections between
the two demonstrate how Polish citizens understand the terribly destructive events of Katyń. For
the Poles, the victims of Katyń became martyrs in their efforts to defend their nation.
In 1999, the Polish government issued a pair of stamps which include “reproductions of
icons. The first, a Madonna and child, is inscribed ‘Our Lady of Victories: Kozelsk’… The second
is inscribed ‘Our Lady of Katyn.’”198 The first design, “Our Lady of Victories,” contains much
more religious imagery than the second. Mary, the Queen of Heaven as well as Poland, has a
certain exhaustion in her eyes. The dark hues, as well as the half-closed eyes themselves, indicate
that despite her crown, this honor did not come easily. This detail speaks to the exhaustion many
Polish mothers also attest to in their daily lives. It also refers to the impact of having a child or
loved one martyred. 199 Mickiewicz’s poem alludes to this physical and emotional fatigue, where
he described “the cruel blow thy breast shall feel.”200 The second, more widely known illustration
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of “Our Lady of Katyń,” features imagery which mirrors that of the Wrocław memorial, with a
venerated mother kissing the bleeding head of a Katyń victim. The pain shown in this stamp is a
more overt sadness, and though no tears of the mother are seen in this portrait, it is not difficult to
imagine “a woman's tears, soon spent” over such a body, which symbolically represents all of the
Katyń victims. 201
The omission of a larger display of appreciation and honor in Lewandowska’s name is
striking, considering the connection between the Matka Polka and memory of Katyń. This may be
due to the fact that the Polish Matka Polka narrative is unable to categorize Lewandowska. She
served in the military, and though she fulfilled many of the same responsibilities as the Matka
Polka at home, this blending of cultural expectations confuses a rigid classification. As Australian
philosopher Vanessa Fredericks notes on the subject of Polish women’s relation to greater Polish
society, “they are (re)producers of the narrative and not the producers of action.”202 Lewandowska
was an active participant in religious life and bolstered patriotic sentiments in the Kozielsk camp.
She remained true to the spirit of the Matka Polka and its saintly model, the Virgin Mary. Yet
despite Lewandowska’s work and sacrifice for her nation, she simultaneously challenged Polish
gender expectation.
While the Poles struggled with her story, the large Polish American population embraced
her multi-faceted legacy. Polish American investment in discovering the truth of the Katyń
massacre began at the Nuremberg War Crime Trials in 1945. Tasked with prosecuting “crimes
against humanity,” Soviet Russia attempted to blame the Germans conclusively for the massacre.
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Despite British and American backlash, the Soviets proceeded.203 The Soviet’s case against the
Germans was weak, relying on purely Soviet-produced testimony and evidence analysis.204 The
ensuing leading questions and combative testimony produced by both the German and Soviet legal
teams caused the final Nuremberg verdicts to avoid condemning either party. The lack of a
conclusive investigation led by a fully impartial party remained a miscarriage of justice in the
minds of American Poles for several years. Against a backdrop of rising Cold War hostilities in
1950, a young Timothy Sheehan decided to run as the Republican Congressional candidate in a
heavily Polish American district in Chicago.205 During his campaign, he consulted with prominent
Polish American leadership, learning that a “pillar of bitterness” within this community was the
Katyń massacre.206 His campaign promise to lead a Congressional investigation became reality
during his first session. On June 26, 1951, he introduced a resolution that called for an investigation
into the massacre.207 This Congressional inquiry concluded that the Soviets were responsible.
Though this was not necessarily new to anyone acquainted with the details of the massacre, the
lengthy research process solidified Katyń as a central part of Polish American consciousness.
This extolling of Lewandowska’s virtues is present in American artistic pieces that address
her legacy. Eugenez Komorowski’s 1974 since-discredited memoir of Katyń, Night Never Ending,
attempted to capitalize on the lack of primary accounts of the massacre. Despite offering little
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historical value, the text inspired poet Kendall Merriam to compose a series of poems about Janina
Lewandowska in 1981.208 His aptly titled book, Hymn for Janina Lewandowska, is an
interpretation of her camp experiences. Referencing her rejection of Soviet re-education efforts,
he writes, “no one could convert/a flier/close to eagles/no one/could convert you/…/a natural
noblewoman/you’d never be a lackey/and give away your friends/away/to be killed/you would
never be/a traitor.”209 Directly addressing Lewandowska, Merriam seeks to construct a pedestal
and lift her from obscurity. His reference to the eagle is both a comment on her pilot skills and a
subtle nod to the Polish coat of arms. Merriam is an American poet, and his praises of
Lewandowska are distinct from the attention she receives in Poland.210 Elsewhere in the text,
Merriam employs Madonna allusions to inspire further rage within the reader over Lewandowska’s
death. Her execution, he writes, “cannot be redeemed by admission/…/nor can it be redeemed/by
even the freedom of Poland/for they have killed you Madonna/and that can never be redeemed.”211
Merriam draws on the strong Marian connection to the Polish community to emphasize his sense
of Lewandowska’s loss, with her death as significant as a holy icon’s. There is no evidence to
suggest similar sentiments persist in Poland, indicating Merriam’s perspective is a uniquely
American one. This American approach to honoring her memory is blunter than the Polish model,
which quietly thanks Lewandowska without the same showiness.
This vein of literary memorialization for Lewandowska is evident in physical memorials
of the massacre in the United States. The National Katyń Memorial in Baltimore, Maryland,
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incorporated Lewandowska into the structure. In 1994, the group announced their plan to build a
46-foot-tall bronze memorial to the massacre in Baltimore.212 The Polish American sculptor,
Andrzej Pitynski, designed the memorial. The memorial has the shape of a flame with the figures
of various historical Poles emerging from the tongues of fire, including three Polish kings in
addition to Polish Americans that fought under George Washington. At the base of the flame are
three Polish soldiers, representing the thousands of Polish victims in the Katyń massacre.213 Their
placement at the base frames these victims as inciting a rebirth of Poland, one that continues to
recall the sacrifices of those that came before. This model of memory is not new but is updated to
reflect one of the most recent tragedies for Poland.
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Figure 2. Rendition of three Polish officers at the Katyń Memorial in Baltimore.
One of these three depicted soldiers is Janina Lewandowska, the only female figure on the
memorial.214 This detail of the memorial echoes the actual massacre, as she was also the only
female officer killed at Katyń. Her inclusion in this national memorial is distinct from the
Smolensk memorial, where she is remembered no differently than other victims. Not only is her
figure a part of the Baltimore memorial, but on the descriptive plaque, she receives a brief
biography. “The one female figure is Lieutenant Jadwiga Lewandowska, a Polish Air Force pilot,”
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it reads, “She is the only known woman to share the fate of her brother officers.”215 Though the
substance of this description does not call attention to her specific contributions to camp life, her
presence on the memorial indicates a distinct respect for her by Polish Americans.
The memorial was designed in 1994, three years before Boleslaw Popielski’s revelation
of the Katyń skulls, and eight years before official confirmation that the female body in Katyń
belonged to Lewandowska.216 Even without express confirmation that it was Lewandowska, the
memorial was technically accurate due to the widespread knowledge of the presence of a female
body in the mass graves. The desire to include the female soldier points to this Polish American
sense of attachment to this figure as a sort of symbol of heroism and exceptionality. Despite the
lack of confirmed information about this woman, inclusion of her likeness served as a reminder to
viewers that the intense patriotism of these soldiers was not confined to any particular gender.
Speaking at the dedication of the memorial in 2000, United States Senator Barbara
Mikulski noted that, “Janina continues to serve as a model of what is best about Polish women and
culture. Her story of faith, patriotism, loyalty and courage, even under the most horrendous
conditions, will continue to inspire generations of Poles and especially, Polish women.”217 Each
of the values Mikulski lists is an attribute of the Matka Polka: loyalty to family and country,
demonstrated by instilling children with a strong sense of patriotism, and courage in recognizing
that their children may become martyrs.
The distinct differences between Polish and American memorializations of Janina
Lewandowska in Poland and the United States raises the question: which befits Lewandowska’s

215

“About the Monument,” National Katyń Memorial Foundation.

216

Sun Staff Writer, "46-ft. bronze sculpture planned for Inner Harbor," The Sun.

217

Barbara Mikulski, “Janina Dowbor-Musnicki Lewandowska,” Polonia Today Online, accessed
December 18, 2020, https://www.katyn.org.au/mikulski.html.

79
view of her relationship to her country? Her dedication to her fellow Polish POWs, seen through
her requesting transfer with them and conversational walks with them in Kozielsk, validates the
Polish method.218 Lewandowska did not seek honors or attention; she saw herself as a Pole, just
like the others in these POW camps. She affected change on an individual level, her interactions
with other prisoners the backbone of her efforts to protect and encourage patriotic sentiments.
Quiet memorials of her impact seem the most aligned with her personal philosophy as
demonstrated by her actions within the Kozielsk camp. And so, her legacy in Poland remains
summarized in one brief sentence: she was the only female POW executed in the Sovietperpetrated Katyń massacre. No mention is made to honors, promotions, or impact on her fellow
soldiers. It is left for the curious few to investigate and determine her impact in Poland, quietly
appreciating a figure whose patriotic efforts were simple, but of consequence to those around her.
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